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ABSTRACT
Previous researchers of the concept of animism,

the

attribution of life to non-living objects, have been
theoretically "divided on the issue of whether animistic
throught is a useful description of the development of
cognition in the child.

Huang, Deutsch, and others con

tend that animistic type responses found by Piaget,
Russell and Dennis, and associates, were but an artifact
of the experimental conditions of asking leading and
suggesting questions.

Three tasks were devised for the

present research which differed in the degree of abstrac
tion inherent in the stimulus item.

Sixty subjects,

ages 3, 4, and 5, were tested individually using a verbal
questionnaire, a pictorial card sort task, and a story
inquiry task involving scaled-model objects.

In each

situation Ss were asked specifically if objects were
alive or not alive.
It was hypothesized that differences in the amount
of animism on the 3 tasks would support the notion that a
child's thought is quantitatively rather than qual i t a 
tively different from that of an adult.

Results from the

present study indicate that Ss were consistent in
attributing or denying life to a majority of items on
paired tests.

This lends credence to the notion that
viii

young children's responses are not task specific.
Animism scores were calculated for each task by counting
the number of times £3 called an inanimate object alive.
These scores were found to be significantly correlated
for all Ss.

Judges were able to reliably classify

Questionnaire protocols into one of four stages of animism
as defined by Laurendeau and Pinard

(1962).

The cri

teria for stages were also applied to the Card Sort task,
with a close correspondence exhibited between those and
the stages on the Questionnaire.
Evidence bearing on the developmental aspect of
animism generally supports Piaget's original formulation
of 4 stages.

Sex was found to be non-contributory in

accounting for the variance in scores, whereas age was
found to be highly significant.

With increasing age,

Ss were found to be less animistic, more consistent in
their judgments,

less dominated by whether an object was

able to move in assessing aliveness,

and more willing to

grant anthropomorphic traits without also granting alive
ness to inanimate objects.
however,

Some findings indicate,

that the conceptual levels of all subjects are

still in a transitional stage of development.

A few

living objects with which Ss probably had had a great
deal of experience were highly unreliable in eliciting
consistent responses across tasks.

Plant life was often

denied life, even by the older Ss. Objects involved in an

objectively accidental situation were often blamed for
what happened;

even though intent was denied, £s of all

ages frequently said that objects should be punished.
Subjects seldom used superficial characteristics
of an object to explain why they called it alive or not.
Functional qualities were employed most often.

The

latter explanations sometimes revealed moralistic
opinions about the usefulness of objects,

illustrating the

tendency toward egocentricity in children's thinking.
In summary, with the utilization of 3 experimental
tasks judged to be reliable and valid in the m e a s u r e 
ment of animism, young children in the current study were
found to exhibit varying degrees of animism.

A remark

able intra-subject consistency prevailed across tasks,
yielding a picture of strongly-held beliefs about animism
in a developmental sequence.

x

INTRODUCTION

"At every stage there remain in the conception of
nature what we might call

'a d h e r e n c e s ', fragments of inter

nal experience which still cling to the external world"
(Piaget, 1930, p. 244).

Animism is one way the child,

his immature state of cognitive development,
such adherences.

in

expresses

In order to gain an appreciation of the

complexities involved in the scientific investigation of
animism, the following discussion will outline three major
areas of concern.

First, the definition of animism,

cluding early philosophical thinking,

in

Piaget's formulation,

and usages of the term in anthropology, psychiatry, and
psychology.

Second, theoretical considerations in the

study of animism,
infantile,

including the concept as being exclusively

the effect of experience on animism, and the

concept of stages of animistic thinking.
ological problems,

And third, meth-

including a discussion of methods

utilized to study animism,

the factors affecting animism

in test situations, and the techniques of data analysis.
Most of this discussion relates research findings to
Piaget's theory, his being the initial systematic formula
tion of the concept of animism.

1

Animism Defined
Even a cursory reading of the literature on animism
reveals a lack of uniform definitions of animism.

This

problem is further complicated by the difficulty in
interpreting behavior as evidence for the presence or ab
sence of animism,

an inferential judgment.

P i a g e t 1s Theory
The writer initially conceived of animism as the at
tribution of animate qualities to inanimate objects.

Most

experimenters, however, have pressed this to the logical
conclusion of attributing "life" to inanimate things.
Even Jean Piaget,

the pioneer in this field as in so many

others in child development, calls animism "the tendency
among children to consider things as living and conscious"
(1933, p.

380).

For Piaget, animism is classified as one

of the 17 types of explanations of causality by children
of all ages.

It is grouped with other prelogical and

egocentric types, given by children up to 7 or 8 years of
age.
Piaget's theory of the origin of child animism in
cludes the notions of indissociation and introjection.
The former term refers to the continuum of psychical and
physical features which are not discriminated in the "prim
itive consciousness".

It is this quality which accounts

for diffuse a n i m i s m , the general tendency of children to
confuse the living and the inert.

Introjection, caused by

3

the egocentricity of the child,

is the tendency to situate

in objects or others the reciprocal feelings to those the
child experiences from their contact.

This action under

lies systematic a n i m i s m , or the explicit animistic beliefs
held by the child.

Piaget explains that the thinking of

the child changes through a dissociation of the physical
and psychial characteristics of things.

That is, as the

child becomes aware of his self and his own thoughts, he
denies awareness and thought in objects.

"In short, the

dissociation of ideas arises from the growth of the con
sciousness of self"

(1929, p. 239).

An important feature of the child's thought is that
objects act intentionally.

A child at this stage of cog

nitive development cannot conceive of action without
consciousness.

Because he is egocentric he is unable to

arrive at an objective or impersonal judgment of events.
Therefore, an object which provokes pain or fear is seen
as doing this intentionally.

In support of this egocen

tricity Piaget cites the reaction children typically have
with regard to their relationship to the moon:

the child

will say with conviction that the moon follows them where
ever they go.

A 4-year-old child told the author that the

moon follows her and no one else, not even her partents
or sister.
Piaget has enumerated a series of stages of animism.
In the first stage, the child attributes life to usefulness
or activity in general.

In the next stage life is
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attributed only to things which move.

The third stage is

characterized by calling those things alive which move
spontaneously.

Finally,

to animals and plants.

the fourth stage restricts life
Piaget assigned approximate age

ranges for each of these s t a g e s :

Stage One from 4 to 6

years, Stage Two, 6 to 7, Stage Three,

8 to 10, and Stage

Four, 11 and over.
Earlier Investigators View Animism
Although Piaget may have been the first to systematic
ally investigate animism, Dennis
thoughts on the subject.

(19 38) reviewed earlier

Writing in the Natural History of

R eligion, Hume said "there is a universal tendency among
mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to
transfer to every object those qualities with which they
are familiarly acquainted,
conscious"

(1854, p. 429).

the animistic tendency ".

and of which they are intimately
Likewise,

Tiedemann held that

. . is certainly due to the fact

that one always envisages an unknown thing through one
that is k n own” (Murchison & Lager,
examples are given by Dennis,

1927, p.

229).

Other

including Comte's proposal

that the earliest forms of religion were based upon " . . .
that tendency of our nature by which Man conceives all
external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his
own"

(1830, p. 155).

Spontaneous A n i m i s m .
Instances of spontaneous animism are numerous.

There

are biographical studies prior to Piaget which attest to
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the ubiquitous nature of this quality.
of his son's comments:

Tiedemann wrote

"The sun has gone to bed,

tomorrow

he will get up again, drink his tea and eat his bread and
butter"

(Murchison & Langer,

1927, p.

229).

Dennis

(1938)

notes a list of more than 50 biographies containing
records of children humanizing objects.
wrote observations of his own daughter,

Dennis

(1942)

of whom he asked

virtually all of Piaget's standard questions.

She respond

ed with answers very similar to those of Piaget's subjects.
These records of spontaneous animistic thought are
very important in the light of criticism leveled by some
who say that it is only the contrived,

artificial experi

mental situation which produces this tendency,

and that

the child is pushed by force of suggestion to answer in
such a manner.

Any close observer of children can see

incidences of animism, many of which are clearly not part
of mere playful fantasy.

The author's daughter, at the

age of 2 years and 4 months, retrieved a favored blanket
from under a chair with the comment,

"My mike

(blanket)

watch t.v., too."
Use of Animism in Psychology Vis a Vis Anthropology
An important distinction mus t be drawn between how
the term "animism" has been used traditionally by psycho
logy and anthropology.

E. B. Tylor

(1888) was one of the

primary forces in defining animism as the granting of
souls or spirits to objects,
term in anthropology.

this being the usage of the

Tylor conceived of this process
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as primitive man's grappling with the facts of trances,
dreams, visions,
other hand,

sleep,

and so forth.

is used in anthropology as endowing objects

with life or vitality.

Thus,

"animism" to the psychologist

is "animatism" to the anthropologist.
(1944)

"Animatism", on the

and Klingberg

Werner and Carrison

(1957) were careful to make this dis

tinction, neglected by a majority of the writers.

Safier

(1964), however, pointed out how the early anthropological
use of animism implied a distinction between object and
object, between body and soul.

Piaget's theory holds that

animism does not arise through a separation of object and
subject, but through a fusion of the two.
Piaget recognized that the term "animism" had been
used by English anthropologists to "describe those beliefs
according to which primitive peoples endow nature with
'souls',

'spirits', etc. in order to explain physical

phenomena"

(1929, p. 169).

Levy-Bruhl and others,

Piaget

continues, have shown that the processes of the primitive
mind are much different from this.

The primitive mind

does not distinguish mind from matter,

and thus they endow

things with both material properties and with will.

Piaget

says he does not mean to imply that child animism and
similar beliefs in primitive peoples have the same meaning
and psychological origins.

He is using the term in a

generic sense to refer to the tendency of the child to
ascribe life and consciousness to non-living things.
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Tynni

(1958)

confuses the issue by calling animism

"the tendency to attribute life or consciousness to in
animate objects or to explain natural phenomena in terms
of animate forces"
usages.

(1958, p.

21),

thus combining the two

A misunderstanding of the term has led several

investigators to challenge the results of others while
lacking precise knowledge of how the concept is being
defined

(e.g., Lowrie,

1954).

Psychoanalytic Usage.
Psychoanalytic literature on animism refers to the
child's psychological closeness to animals.

Freud had a

great interest in the animal fantasies of children and
was impressed by the fact that children do not discrimi
nate sharply between animals and humans.

"Children have

no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their full
equals.

Uninhibited as they are in the avowal of their

bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more akin to
animals than to their elders, who may well be a puzzle to
them"

(Freud,

ren 's

books,

1950, p. 127).

Some would argue that child

songs, and toys which portray animals behav

ing as humans influence the child in this regard.

In a

sense, Freud contradicted himself in saying that children
do not discriminate between animals and humans, and then
remarking that children feel more closely related to ani
mals than to adult humans.

For Freud,

accounts for animism is projection.

the mechanism which

Piaget argues that

mere projection, or introjection in his scheme,

is
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inadequate to describe animism without the additional
notion of indissociation, whereby the child does not sepa
rate psychical from physical and attributes "to things not
only what belongs to us . . . but also characteristics re
ciprocal to our o w n — malice when we are afraid, obedience
when we command,

. . . etc."

(Piaget,

1929, p. 244).

In an effort to study experimentally the effect of
animal vs. human stimuli in a story-telling task,

several

investigators presented children two sets of picture cards,
one set with human characters and one with animals.

Al

though the studies varied in terms of stimuli and experi
mental precision,

the results generally indicated no

difference in the stories told with regard to length, com
plexity, clinical usefulness, or other qualitative features
(Biersdorf & Marcuse,

1953; Bills,

1950; Budoff,

There is some evidence that children

1960).

in the upper primary grades
with human pictures

1950, Bills,

(age 8 and above)

et a l . ,

identify more

(Light, 1954; Boyd & Mandler,

1955),

but there seems no marked favor of animal pictures at the
younger age leves.

These results would seem to support

Piaget's indissociation theory rather than the Freudian
mechanism of projection whereby the child should favor
animals as a vehicle for expressing needs,

fears, and other

motives.
Two Views of Animism in Psychology
The psychological literature contains basically 2
groups representing what might be termed "positive" and

"negative" approaches.

The first describes animism as the

result of the immature development of the child's thought,
a qualitatively different process from adult logic.

The

second group holds that there is no such thing as precausal or prelogical thought and that the only difference
between child and adult thought is in the amount of know
ledge accrued.

Members of the "positive" group proclaim

the existence of animism, while those of the "negative"
stance deny it.
There is argument concerning the nature of the initial
stage of development of child thought.
associates,

Huang and his

for example, prefer to describe the situation

as one in which the child begins in a neutral and indeter
minate state, which is neither animism nor physicalism,
and then proceeds by the process of differentiation to the
adult state of causality,

i.e., physicalism.

Klingberg

has rephrased this by saying that "growth goes from ignor
ance to better and better knowledge"

(1957, p. 236).

Jahoda points out that what "Piaget attempted to do was to
show that what in the past had been taken as mere ignor
ance was in fact a reflection,

in a variety of spheres,

of the immature state of mental development of the child"
(1958a, p. 204).
In the above discussion of the usage of the term
"animism" the reader no doubt got a glimpse of the co m 
plexity of the issues.
is challenged,

The very existence of the behavior

as is the reality of precausal thinking in
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general.

The purpose of the present research is not to

settle the latter issue, but rather to investigate further
the facets of animism in children.

A working operational

definition of the term animism for the present study will
be those instances of child behavior, both verbal and non
verbal,

in which the child attributes to non-living ob 

jects characteristics not typically given them by educated
adults of the same culture.

This would include the attri

bution of "life" and the endowment of characteristics more
specific in nature,

such as moving, making noise,

and

feeling.
Theoretical Issues in the Study of Animism
Jahoda

(1958a), Laurendeau and Pinard

Looft and Bartz

(1962), and

(1969) all discussed critically the theoreti

cal and methodological divergences occurring in the vast
array of studies on animism.

While Jahoda

(1958a) was

primarily concerned with accounting for cross-cultural
variations,

the latter two researchers attempted to ferret

out the more subtle sources of disagreement.

The following

paragraphs will briefly review these issues together with
previous findings in the area of animism research.
The measurement of animism is at first glance an almost
impossible task.

It requires the reflections of thought

processes from subjects sometimes too young for direct
confrontation.
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Animism as an Infantile Concept
Studies of animism have been conducted on Ss of all
ages, although a majority have centered on school aged
children, from about 5 to 12 years old.

This possibly

would be beyond the age of "diffuse animism" as delineated
by Piaget and into the period of "systematic animism",
more influenced by social, cultural, and intra-individual
factors.

At virtually every age level there are both

substantiating and refuting studies with regard to Piaget's
model of animistic thought.
Piaget's subjects were all children,
spoke of "child animism".

and therefore he

Some criticize him for assuming

that animism is present only in the young.

Several studies

conducted on college students reveal that some animistic
responses are obtained even from those with a course in
biology

(Dennis, 1953; Crannell,

1954; Crowell & Dole,
1957).

1957;

1954; Bell, 1954; Voeks,

Dennis,

1957;

Simmons & Gross,

In an investigation including £s from 70 to 90

years of age, Dennis and Mallinger

(1949)

found a surpris

ing amount of animism.
The Effect of Specific Experiences on Anim i s m
Cross-cultural research on animism is of particular
importance in the light of long-standing debate over
whether the civilized child's mind is equivalent to the
mind of primitive man.

Comte,

is his treatise on religion,

spoke of animism in children being like that found in
primitives and even in infra-human primates.

He illustrated
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his convictions by claiming that a monkey, a child, and
a primitive m a n would all react in a similar way when
confronted with a watch, only their form of expression
differing.
Levy-Bruhl likewise asserted that primitive mentality
is mystical, precausal, and prelogical— qualitatively dif
ferent from civilized man

(1923, 1926).

Huang

(1943)

mentions that both H. Werner and C. Raspe draw a close
parallelism between the mind of a child and that of primi
tive peoples.

Huang points out that the evidence for such

a relationship is typically speculative and anecdotal.

He

challenges the possibility that a child thinks exclusively
in animistic terms across varying conditions.
Klingberg

(1957)

set out to determine if the animistic

tendency is based upon a primitive mental structure as
hypothesized by Piaget.

The author notes that Piaget was

influenced by Levy-Bruhl and "genetic parallels", based
on the recapitualtion theory.

Since the idea of the

primitive mentality of uncivilized man has been discarded
in ethnology,

Klingberg suggests that this constitutes an

error in reasoning by Piaget.

He concludes by admitting

that children often attribute life to certain non-living
objects, but says that Piaget's hypothesis is untenable
because of faulty logic and further that it cannot be
tested by empirical means.
Mead

(19 32)

formulated the problem this way:

"Was

the thought of primitive children characterized by the
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type of animistic premise, anthropomorphic interpretation
and faulty logic, which had been recorded for civilized
children, or was this type of thought a product of special
social environment?"

(Mead, 1932, p. 174).

In her study

of Manus children she found no evidence of "spontaneous
animism" and concluded that animistic thought cannot be
explained in terms of intellectual immaturity.

She co n 

cluded that this tendency must be culturally determined
rather than an inevitable concomitant of a particular stage
of mental development.

It must be recognized, however,

that Mead's methods were very different from Piaget's and
others investigating this area.
Some support for Mead's contention that animism is
wholly determined by cultural influences is found in the
results of a study involving American school children.
Johnson and Josey

(1931-32), using Piaget's method without

change, could not duplicate the results found wi t h Swiss
and French children.

One of their explanations was that

the English language was superior to the French as an
instrument for logical thinking.
In a comprehensive review of cross-cultural research
on animism, Jahoda
American children
1940a,

(1958a) covers studies done on white
(Lerner, 1937; Deutsche,

1942) , Hopi and Zuni Indian children

Russell, 1940;

Dennis,

Chinese children

1937;

Russell,

(Dennis &

1943; Havighurst & Neugarten,

1955),

(Huang, Chen & Yang, 19 35; Huang & Lee,

1945), European children

(Askar, 1932; Klingberg,

1957),
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and the Manus children of Ne w Guinea

(Mead, 1932).

Jahoda

admits that at first impression the reader is struck by
the absence of consistent trends.

He then reviews Piaget's

theory, with regard to diffuse and systematic animism
with special emphasis on social factors which Piaget sug
gested would favor the persistence of animism.
tors included

(1) feelings of participation,

of moral obligation, and

These fac

(2) feelings

(3) the language itself.

It is

easy to conjecture how various cultures would differentially
reinforce animism,

and thus cross-cultural uniformity of

animistic responses could not be anticipated following the
age of diffuse animism, ending about 5 years of age.

In

a study of animism with children of West Africa, Jahoda
(1958b) discussed some subtle cultural factors which might
explain the low incidences of animism found.
Looft and Bartz

(1969) reviewed some empirical evi

dence both supporting and refuting the notion that environ
mental influences largely determine the presence of animism.
Ezer

(1962) found that children from more religious homes

tended to give more precausal explanations.
and Tynni

(1958), however,

Dennis

(1942)

cite results which reject the

hypothesis that animism is transmitted from parent to off
spring in the "teaching process".

It would seem that blind

adherence to either extreme of the nature-nurture continuum
would lead to a vunerable theoretical position.
Piaget demonstrated that even when the relevant facts
are disclosed to the child that he will not be swayed from
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his opinions

(1929, p. 175).

Contrary to these observa

tions, however, are the results of Looft and Charles
(1969).

These authors found marked alternation of the

life concept in some 8-year-old children after being shown
a movie on the biological criteria for living as opposed
to non-living things.

It seems to this writer that older

children may be "prepared" to assimilate such information
whereas younger Ss may not show such marked change.

It

could be further postulated that if the presentation of
of such information could be on the child's level, whatever
age that may be, that a significant change may take place.
The Stage Concept of Animism
There has been much theoretical debate regarding the
validity of a stage concept,
tinuous or discontinuous.
lative discussions,

i.e., whether growth is con

Without dwelling on the specu

suffice it to say that if growth occurs,

it may be described in a series of stages.

Piaget assigned

age limits for each of his stages of animism.

Nearly every

investigator has taken him to task on this point, although
he had warned that:
There is no fully consistent age progression;
development may fluctuate with regressions and
jumps (p. 190); some children aged between five
and six exhibit hardly any animism (p. 178)
whilst much older ones may do so (1929, p. 218).
And, further, he said that "We should not dream of guaran
teeing the soundness of the present technique as a means
of individual diagnosis"

(1929, pp.

188-189).
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For Piaget, however,

the stage concept is more than

a simplified description of the growth process.

It is not

merely that growth occurs, but rather that notions about
the world are learned by the child which replace the
former concepts.

Thus, child thought differs qual i t a 

tively from adult thinking.

The concepts of filiation

and substitution are employed by Laurendeau and Pinard
(1962) to describe the progression from prelogical to
causative thinking.

Two performances hold a relation of

filiation when they have common characteristics and when
the superior performance derives from the preceding through
a process of transformation.

This transformation implies

an integration of the inferior performance into the supe
rior.

On the other hand, development occurs through sub

stitution when subsequent performances simply replace
antecedent performances,

this process being gradual and

with an intermediate stage of the two overlapping.

The

authors further state that the child's causal thinking
seems to develop through substitution rather than filiation.
Laurendeau

and Pinard

(1962) were able to reliably

classify 500 Ss into 4 stages of animism,

these being re

finements of Piaget's original formulations.
The present experiment clearly shows that, in
effect, realism, artificialism, animism, and so
on, are so many beliefs that disappear little
by little to be replaced by more objective, or
more physical concepts.
A rather long period
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is always observed during which primitive notions
are still intermingled with explanations of a
superior type, but nothing indicates that the
superior performances are derived from a trans
formation or an integration of inferior perfor
mances.
Physicalism is not the natural expansion
of realism or of articialism in the same sense
that operational thinking, for example, is the
prelongation and the consummation of preoperational thinking (1962, p. 259).
Historically,

Comte

(1830-42)

also believed that later

thought stages do not completely eliminate the earlier
notions.
Critics of the stage concept point to the overlapping
of age groups.

This argument is not viable in view of our

awareness of individual differences.

Huang

(1943) p ro

claims that because a child's response is stimulus det e r 
mined, no general stage of thinking can be attributed to
him.

Looft and Bartz

(1969)

take the critics to task for

not approaching the cogent question,

that of verifying the

constancy of the sequential order of a child's mode of
thought.

This would best be examined via a longitudinal

study involving many Ss, a rare species in psychology
today.
Methodological Considerations in the Investigation
of Animism
Animism has been studied almost exclusively with verbal
techniques.

A few researchers utilized experiments involv

ing simple objects testing cause and effect relationships
as a means of evaluating the concept of aliveness.

Two

general trends in verbal techniques have been developed.
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One, following Piaget's lead, employs a questionnaire
with sufficient inquiry procedures to determine the S^'s
rationale in answering.

The other variation is to simply

record Ste "yes" or "no" responses to the question "Is the
_____

alive or not?".

Further lack of standardization has

been evident in the test items, the wording of the ques
tions, and in the analysis of the data.
P i a g e t 1s Clinical Method and Subsequent Refinements
Piaget's clinical method consisted of a question and
answer session with each subject.
was asked "Is the _____
as moon, river,

Specifically,

the child

alive?", with such stimulus words

sun, stone, etc. being supplied.

Then

follow-up questions were asked,

in which the subject is

asked to justify his response.

Piaget claims that even

counter-suggestion cannot move the child to change his
opinion,

thus providing an impressive measure of the depth

of the convictions.
His method has been much criticized, although most of
the allegations against it were discussed by Piaget himself,
with warnings against the pitfalls intrinsic in it

(1929).

His point of departure was observation of spontaneous com
ments by children, then a formulation of a flexible sche
dule of queries to put to other subjects.

Piaget made it

clear that one must substantiate interview findings with
further pure observation.
Issacs

(1930) and Deutsche

(1937) severely criticize

Piaget's clinical method as being sterotyped and the
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questions suggestive,

the situation being thus more co n 

ducive to eliciting the child's fantasies than his intel
lectual tools.
A pioneer in the survey questionnaire approach was
G. Stanley Hall

(1883) who also discussed the types of

replies occurring under such conditions.
does Piaget

Hall insists, as

(1929) that despite these disadvantages,

there

are certain elements "which every tactful and experienced
friend of children" learns to ferret out.

The hallmark of

the clinical method seems to be intuition and experience.
Although Piaget painstakingly devoted the first part of
The Child's Conception of the World

(1929)

of the problems inherent in the method,

to discussion

the readings never

theless left other experimenters without a precise, practi
cal method to use with their subjects.
this problem,

Russell and Dennis

In the light of

(1939, 1941) undertook to

standardize a method for measuring animism.
was a list of 20 objects,

Their result

including such objects as a

stone, tree, broken dish, dog, and broken button.
subject was asked of each object,
dead?

Why?"

The

"Is the _______ alive or

Additional questions were asked regarding

autonomous or imparted movement w h e n necessary.
the 385 Ss examined by Russess and Dennis

Most of

(1933, 1941)

aged

3 to 15 could be classified as functioning in one of four
stages of animism described by Piaget

(1933).

A further refinement of the questionnaire technique
was developed by Laurendeau and Pinard

(1962)

for their
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investigation of precausal thought.

The "concept of life"

questionnaire was administered to 500 £s between the ages
of 4 and 13 in Montreal, Canada.
the subject matter by asking,
be alive?

"Do you know what it is to

What does it mean?

things which are alive."

Give me the name of some

Then the child was questioned

specifically about 22 objects,
Why do you say it is

The authors introduced

e.g.,

(not) alive?"

"Is a mountain alive?
Another section of the

questionnaire dealt with comparisons:

the child was asked

if certain things were "more alive" than others.
prizingly,

Not sur-

the data from this section was quite confusing

and the results were eliminated from the main analysis.
Factors Affecting Animi s m in Test Situations
The meaning of the q u e s t i o n s .

While many of the

early investigators were confident that the question "Is
it alive?" would be interpreted similarily by the child
as by the experimenter,

Russell

(1940b) was the first to

attempt clarification of just what an affirmative reply to
this question might mean.
of questions,

Russell employed a standard set

substituting "knowing" and "feeling" for

"living or dead".

His results showed significant positive

correlations between the stages of animism and the stages
of these allied concepts.

The correlations,

further, were

much higher than those obtained between animistic stage
and either M.A. or chronological age.

Russell interpreted

the data as measuring similar concepts and that a measure

of animism was also an index of the S's concept of life.
Looft and Bartz

(1969) pointed out that Russell used the

dichotomy "living" vs.

"dead", terms quite different from

"living" and "not living".

"Dead" implies having once

been alive, whereas "not living" does not.

Children some

times classify a broken dish as "dead" because is is of
no use

(Russell & Dennis,

1939).

A further test would be

presentation of a situation where an object is repaired
and made usable once again.

If £ said "dead" in response

to the fixed object, then his reasoning would be on a
higher level than Piaget's Stage One.

Piaget

(1920)

found

similar stages of "consciousness" attribution as he did
levels of animism.

That is, he found that the child in

Stage Two of animism would attribute "consciousness" to
an object which moved,

regardless of whether the movement

was spontaneous or imparted.
Several investigations have dealt with contrasting
various phrases which all mean "being or not being alive"
to an educated adult.
"non-living"
life"

Phrases included "living" vs.

(Crowell & Dole, 1957),

"living" vs.

(Huang & Lee, 1945), and "living" vs.

(Klingberg,

1957).

"having

"has it life?"

Some argue that when a child says that

something is "living" he does not necessarily endow it
with all the biological qualities and/or spiritual charac
teristics of humans.

To determine this, Huang and Lee

(1945) asked their subjects if an object was living, has
life, and also whether the same ob act feels pain when
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pricked,

is capable of wanting and not wanting,

good or not good, has anything it must do
performs this purposely.

can be

(function), and

The authors found that their Ss,

ages 3:5 to 8:7, said an inanimate object was "living”
in only a small percentage of cases.

Further,

the Ss

often refused to attribute anthropomorphic traits to the
same inanimate objects previously said to"have life".

Huang

and Lee interpreted their data as showing that the child's
usage of the term "living" does not have the same meaning
to a child as to an educated adult.
The distinction between "is it living?" and "has it
life?" was studied by Klingberg

(1957).

He obtained more

animistic answers to the former question, which may have
puzzled some ,Ss.

This confusion may have led to no answer

at all or to one not indicative of the child's thinking.
The use of the question "why?" in order to clarify
the child's rationale has elicited criticism
1953).

Nass

(1956)

(Klingensmith,

found that more animistic replies are

given to questions beginning with "why" than to those
starting with "how do you k n o w " .

There is some reason to

suggest that the "why" question may be interpreted by the
child as a demand for immediate justification of his
position, a "cornering" technique.
child to give a rather hurried,

This may cause the

superficial response, more

likely to be of an animistic quality.

On the other hand,

a "how?" may signal the subject that he is to give more
analytical support,

thus encouraging him to take more time
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to think and subsequently giving a more mature
animistic")

explanation

(Looft & Bartz,

("non-

1969).

Items employed on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .

The choice

of objects in a questionnaire format seems to affect the
amount of animism obtained.

Klingensmith

(19 53) found

that his Ss were almost 10 times as likely to say that
a clock or a candle were alive than to say the same about
a match, dish, knife, or comb.
the candle

Note that the clock and

(if the child thinks of it as lighted) both

exhibit a seemingly autonomous movement, whereas the other
objects do not.
Deutsche

(1937) and Huang

(1943) report that the child

shows marked inconsistencies in responding.

They argue

that if a child's mode of thinking is generally precausal,
then he should attack all problems with this same procli
vity.

A counter argument is the degree-of-familiarity

notion, which holds that the more direct experience a
child has with an object,

the more likely he will react to

it on a realistic, objective, knowledgeable basis.

This

description of situation confrontation certainly holds for
all humans, regardless of age.

Studies involving m e n 

tally retarded Ss who show a high incidence of
animism,

indicate the more familiar the S is w i t h the

phenomenon,

the less animism is exhibited
1940).

(Granich,

1940;

Russell, Ash,

& Dennis,

In the light of this

notion, then,

the objects on a questionnaire list with

which the child is the most familiar should be the ones
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eliciting the least animism.

In general this is true, but

it appears that the characteristics of the object might
serve as stimulus cues more often than just the amount of
direct contact by the child.
Analyses of the Data
What behaviors constitute anim i s m ?

A recurrent

disagreement has been what behaviors constitute the exis
tence of animism and whether this must be consistently
portrayed by the child across all situations.

P i a g e t ’s

theory was interpreted by some as stating that animism is
present all the time in younger Ss, whereas others
Jahoda,

1958a)

(e.g.,

have culled his writings for exceptions to

the rule.
A number of studies concluding that there is no evi
dence for the presence of animism can be interpreted in
another manner.

For example, Oakes,

(1947)

refuted the

notion that animistic thought is characteristic in chi l d 
ren's thinking.

This ma y be a valid conclusion, but her

data does show that from 4% to 10% of the various age
groups gave nonphysical explanations.

The controversy

seems to stem from the disagreement as to what constitutes
evidence fro the presence of animism.
Strauss

(1951)

in a critical re-evaluation of the

data of Huang and Lee

(1945) demonstrated how their con

clusions could be refuted by a reinterpretation of the
same data.

Strauss also was critical of the criteria em

ployed by Huang and Lee

(1945).
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Individual v s . grouped d a t a .

Dissimilar methods

of data analysis have caused problems in the exploration of
animism.

Researchers who generally favor the existence

of animism have utilized group analyses.

These investiga

tors concentrate on the number of children giving at least
one animistic response during the entire experimental
procedure.

Representatives of this type of analysis are

Piaget, the Russell and Dennis studies, and Laurendeau and
Pinard

(1962).

Investigators generally opposed to the

hypothesis of precausality have typically analyzed each
item, noting the percentage of Ss who react animistically
to it.

Since children seem to react differentially to many

inanimate objects in terms of their willingness to attri
bute life, it is easy to see how the latter method would
yield lower frequencies of animism.

Among experimenters

using the second approach are Huang and Lee

(1945), Kling-

berg

(1947).

(1957) , Klingensmith

and Bartz

(1953), and Oakes

Looft

(1969) suggest experimenter bias may have been

operating a priori to produce the choice of units for
analysis.
Individual item analysis involves summing the number
of "yes" and "no" responses to questions about the objects
(Huang & Lee, 1945).

As Laurendeau and Pinard

(1962)

astutely reasoned, a "correct" response does not necessarily
indicate that the logic underlying it is also correct.
They cite examples of pseudo-solutions, quoting Ausubel
and Schiff

(1954) and Greco

(1959).

It is further argued
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that if "one is to estimate correctly any single child's
true level of thinking, a global analysis of the entire
pattern of his responses is necessary"
1969, p.

6).

Looft and Bartz

(Looft & Bartz,

(1969) conclude their remarks

on this question by stating that while differences in
data analysis account somewhat for some divergent results,
studies using the same methods of examination can also
yield markedly disparate findings.
The Problem
The present research seeks to provide information on
the following q u e s t i o n s :
1.

To what extent are animistic responses situation

and task specific?

Some researchers have used verbal

questionnaire tasks with varying degrees of inquiry; others
have presented demonstrations of physical experiments de 
signed to test the child's knowledge of cause and effect
relationships.

It is difficult to compare results from

these two types of situations.

In the present study,

the

concept of aliveness was tested in three situations which
differ in the degree of abstraction of the stimuli.
Responses to items on a verbal questionnaire, a pictorial
card sort, and a model representation in a story inquiry
task were compared.
2.

Are there differences in the amount of animism as

a function of age and sex?

Previous studies have failed

to demonstrate sex differences,

and there is a marked

disagreement about developmental decrements in animism.
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The present study involved a 3 year age range designed to
ferret out age differences in animistic thinking.
3.

What criteria do preschool Ss use in inferring

the concept of "living" as opposed to "non-living” in
objects?

The method of having children separate objects

or pictures into several categories which might be asso
ciated with the concept of animism was used,
the suggestion of Looft and Bartz
cation with Looft,

1969).

following

(1969; personal communi

The use of a card sorting task

in the present study provided information on how Ss define
"living" and "not living",

as well as the consistency of

application of these concepts across exemplars.

METHOD

Subjects
The sample consisted of 60 children between the ages
of 3 and 6 years.

The Ss, from private nursery schools

and public kindergarten classes in the Los Angeles area,
were selected on the basis of the absence of any signifi
cant behavioral or emotional problem.

Freedom from gross

behavioral problems was judged on the basis of interviews
with the teachers.

The kindergarten Ss had at least one

year of nursery school experience.

Ten Ss, five females

and five males, constituted each 6-month age block.
Procedure
The study included three tasks, each presented indi
vidually with order counter-balanced across Ss. Because
of the high activity level and short attention span of the
Ss, three sessions were required to complete the testing.
An attempt was made to have sessions on consecutive school
days.

The maximum time span for any one S was 10 days.

The procedures for the three experimental tasks follow.
Qu e s t ionnaire.

The Concept of Life Questionnaire

devised by Laurendeau and Pinard
study.

(1962) was used in this

Laurendeau and Pinard caution that verbal tests

on S s less than 4 years of age are ineffective,

however

use o f questionnaires in previous studies of animism
28
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warranted inclusion of this technique in a cross-method
comparison.

Two items were added to the Laurendeau-Pinard

instrument to gain comparability with other instruments
used in this study.

The format for the task follows:

Instructions to E:

Ask the child each one of the

following questions,

trying always to make sure

he understands it well.

When necessary,

tions may be repeated.
General Q u e s t i o n s :
alive,

the ques

Record all answers v e r b a t i m .

"Do you know what it is to be

to be living?"

"Give me the name of some

things which are alive."
Specific Q u e s t i o n s :

Note:

a separate 3" x 5" card.

Each item was typed on
The cards were shuffled

for each S to ensure a random presentation.
know what a ______ is, don't you?
alive?" "Why do you say that it is

"You

Is a _ _ _ _ _
(not) alive?"

Continue with the remaining 22 items, presenting
each one with the questions,
After £ responds,
it is

then ask,

"Is a _____

alive?"

"Why do you say that

(not) alive?"

The 23 test items were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

mountain
table
cat
lamp
bird
wind
fly
flower

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

tree
bicycle
pencil
sun
car
cloud
watch
bell

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

airplane
fire
rain
snake
fish
child (same sex as S)
dog

Card Sort task.

Materials for this task consisted

32 cards with pictures of the following objects:
*1.
*2.
3.
*4.
5.
*6.
*7.
*8.
*9.
*10.
11.
*12.
*13.
14.
15.
*16.

mountain
sun
broken pencil
car
tricycle with 1 wheel
table
cat
cloud
lamp
watch
jack-in-the-box
bird
bell
smoke
pair of smashed glasses
airplane

*17.
*18.
*19.
20.
*21.
*22.
*23.
*24.
25.
*26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
*31.
*32.

fly
fire
flower
broken dish
boy
rain
tree
snake
motorcycle
fish
crayon
Raggedy Ann doll
t.v. set
knife
dog
girl

Items marked with an * are pictures of objects also p re
sented on the Questionnaire.

Only the picture of the

child the same sex as £ was presented.

The damaged items

were included to test further the finding that a diffe r e n 
tial response is obtained to such objects because of their
broken, and hence, useless state

(Russell & Dennis,

Pictures were colored photographs,

1939).

3-1/2" by 3-1/2"

with a pastel background, mounted on white mat board 4" by
4", and covered with clear contact paper.

The cards were

numbered in the upper left hand corner to simplify scoring.
The cards were shuffled before each presentation.
Six additional cards, constructed in an identical
manner, served as sample stimuli.

Objects pictured on

these cards included:
1.
2.
3.

stone
horses
bricks

4.
5.
6.

push toy
pull toy
baby
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Photographs of the cards used in this task are found in
Appendix A.
The set of 31 test cards were separated into the
following categories:

(1) moves vs. doesn't move,

alive vs. is not alive.

(2) is

£s were asked to sort cards

they had placed in the "moves" category into one of the
additional categories,
move autonomously".

"moves autonomously" or "doesn't

Thus, there were 2 complete sorts

and 1 partial sort.
The procedure for the card sort tasks f o l l o w s :
E accompanied £ to the experimental situation and
directed

to sit in a chair at a table of the approxi

mate height for the child.

E sat directly opposite from J3.

Sample i t e m s :
E placed the two sample cards depicting the horses
and the bricks on the table approximately 8 inches apart.
E said,

"Here are pictures of two things,

(pointing)

and some bricks

(pointing).

moves and one thing does not move.
thing that moves."
or "Good".

some horses

One of these things

Put your finger on the

If S responded correctly, E said "Fine"

Then E said "Now put your finger on the thing

which does not move."

If S again responded correctly, E

praised his response and proceeded with the test items.
If S chose the incorrect sample card, E said,
this

(indicating the correct choice)

"No,

is the thing that

moves.

Now, put your finger on the thing which does not

move".

If S responded correctly,

E said "Fine" or "Good".
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Then the second set of sample cards was placed on top
of the first set.
a stone.

E said "Here are pictures of a baby and

Put your finger on the thing whi c h moves."

The

rest of the sample directions were identical to those of
the first sample.

Following the second sample, E p ro

ceeded with the test items.
The complete list of the sample cards for the cate
gories f o l l o w s :
CATEGORY

SAMPLE CARDS

Moves vs. doesn't move.

1) horse and bricks
2) baby and stone

Moves autonomously vs.
doesn't move
autonomously.

1) horse and push toy
2) baby and pull toy

Is it alive vs.
not alive.

1) baby and bricks
2) horse and stone

is not

Test items:
The first test card was placed on the table below and
equidistant from the sample cards which remained visible.
E said,

"Does this not move, or does it move?"

indicated his response,

E said,

After S

"Then it goes right here"

(placing the card directly below the corresponding sample,
turning the test card face down in the p r o c e s s ) .
which move go here

"Things

(indicating the position on the table

relative to the horse card) and the things whi c h do not
move go here"

(indicating the appropriate p l a c e ) .

remainder of the test cards were presented,

The

each being held

slightly above the table to encourage S to take the card
and place it in the stack he selected.
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The additional categories of the card sort were pre
sented in the same manner.
Order and sequences of positive and negative forms
of the question were randomized, within the constraints
that half of the questions were positive forms, and that
runs were limited to 2.

The following are positive and

negative question f o r m s :
1.

a.
b.

Does this move or does it not move?
Does this not move or does it move?

2.

a.

Does this move by itself or does it
not move by itself?
Does this not move by itself or does
it move by itself?

b.

3.

a.
b.

Is this alive or is it not alive?
Is this not alive or is it alive?

Reliability;
A reliability study of the Card Sort stimuli was con
ducted using 10 3-year-old Ss, half of them being younger
than 3 years 7 months.

All Ss attended a private nursery

school.
The test was administered twice, with one week inter
val between sessions.

The procedure for the test follows:

E accompanied S to the experimental situation and
directed S to sit in a chair at a table of the appropriate
height for the child.

E sat directly opposite S.

E placed the 2 sample cards depicting the baby and
the bricks on the table with the comment,
pictures.

One thing,

the baby

"Here are two

(pointing to the baby)

alive, but the bricks are not alive."

If S succeeded,

is
E
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said "Fine” or "Good."

Then E said,

on the thing which is not alive."
was reinforced.

"Now put your finger

The correct response

If S failed the first sample,

E corrected

him and presented the second sample, pictures of a horse
and a stone.

The procedure was identical to that of the

first sample.

The 31 test items were then presented using

the "Alive-Not Alive" categories in the same manner as
described above for the actual research.
A Spearman Rank correlation coefficient was performed.
The S's rank was determined by the total number of cards
in which objects depicted were called alive compared to
the number so labeled by the other 9 Ss for the session.
The resulting correlation represents the relative stability
of position of the Ss across the two sessions.
yielded an r

s

= .908.

From this data,

This

the author concluded

that the responses of the 3-year-olds to the Card Sort
items are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
study.

The high reliability in response stability for

the 3-year-olds indicates that the responses of older
children would also show stability.
Story Inquiry t a s k .

The materials for this task in

cluded a stage depicting an outdoor scene, a model of a
tree, and 5 toy objects.

The 1/4" plywood floor of the

stage measured 3' by 4' upon which artificial grass was
attached.
a road.

Finely ground brown sawdust was used to outline
The 1/4" plywood background of the stage measured
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2' high and 4' wide.
5 fluffy white clouds.

This was painted pale blue, with
A circle 2" in diameter was drilled,

through which the head of a flashlight was inserted.

A

circle with rays was cut from yellow tissue paper placed
over frosted acetate.

This was positioned over the hole

in the background to represent the sun.
The artificial tree was constructed using a branch
from an actual

bush.

the branches.

The tree was 24" high

24" across at the top.

Small plastic leaves were pasted on
and approximately

The toys included 2 orange steel

V o l k s w a g o n s , one having a smashed roof, a bendable white
and brown dog resembling a fox terrier and measuring 1"
high and 1" long, and bendable boy and girl dolls,
2-3/4" high.

each

The scale of the objects was 3/4" to 1'.

Photographs of the stimuli are found in Appendix B.
The procedure for the Story Inquiry Task f o l l o w s :
The stage

was set on a table of

the experimental room, with

appropriate height in

the tree positioned on the

grass in the upper right quadrant of the floor of the
stage.

Four of the toy objects were arranged randomly to

the left of the stage.
used with each S.

Only the doll of the same sex was

E led the child to the stage and said,

"Here are some things which yo u may play with or do w h a t 
ever you wish."
for 3 minutes.

E allowed S to investigate the equipment
Then E said,

would like for you to hear.

"Now I have some stories I
I will move some of the toys

around while the tape recorder plays a story."

S was

seated in a chair in front of the stage while the stories
were being presented.

E began the tape of the first story

and manipulated the appropriate objects.
story was completed, E said,
about the story we just saw."

After the first

"Now I have some questions
The set of questions cor

responding to the story presented was asked.
£'s answers verbatim on a data sheet.

E recorded

Then the second

story and set of questions was presented,

then the third.

Stories were presented in a counterbalanced order across
Ss.
Each story involved 4 primary objects and 2 background
objects not directly involved in the action.
objects were used in all 3 stories:

The same 6

a dog, a child

sex as S ) , a tree, a car, the sun, and the clouds.
list included 3 living and 3 non-living objects.

(same
The

Previous

research has shown that younger children often regard a
tree as not living
Lee,

1945),

(Laurendeau and Pinard,

1962; Huang and

thus its inclusion in the present study.

The actions of the three stories used for this task
were as follows:

(1) the car in the road hits the dog,

(2) a branch from the tree falls and smashes the top of
the car, and
dog.

(3) the child is running and trips over the

The tape transcripts of the narrations of the stories

follow:
"Here are some stories about a boy
car, and a tree.

(girl), a dog, a

The sun is shining in the sky and some

clouds are scattered about.

Here is our first story."
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(Story 1)

"The boy

(girl)

The car is in the street.

is playing in the grass.

The dog looks as though he's

pretty close to the

street. I hope that car isn't moving,

(pause)

is going farther out into the street.

Now the dog

The car i £ moving.

(pause)

close to the dog now.
(pause)

The car is really getting

The dog doesn't see the car coming,

The car has hit the dog and he's lying down in

the street."
(Story 2)

(End of story 1)
"In this story we see the car parked

beneath the tree.

The boy(girl)

in the grass nearby

(pause)

and the dog are playing

It looks like something is

happening to a branch on the tree.

(pause)

Yes, the

branch has broken off the tree and has fallen on top of
the car.
the car."

(pause)

The branch really crushed the top of

(End of story 2).

(Story 3)

"This time the car is parked by the street.

The dog is lying down in the grass and the boy
running.

(pause)

It looks as though the boy

not watching where he's

(she's) going,

(girl) had better look quickly or he
the dog.

(pause)

The boy

has tripped over him.
a tumble.

(girl)

is
is

(pause) The boy

(she) might run into

(girl) didn't see the dog and

(pause)

(pause) The boy

(girl)

He's

(she's) really taking

(girl) has fallen all the way

over the dog and is lying in the grass."

(End of story 3)

The inquiry questions for the stories follow.
of the primary questions is numbered.

Each

The additional
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questions were asked if S responded affirmatively to the
primary question.
Story 1:

Car hits the dog.

1.

The car hit the dog; is it the car's fault?
How is it the car's fault?

2.

Is it the dog's fault?
How is it the dog's fault?

3.

Did the car mean to hit the dog?

4.

Should someone or something be punished for what
happened?
Who should be punished?
How should
they be punished?

5.

Does the sun know wha t happened?
How does the sun feel about what happened?

6.

Does the tree know wh a t happened?
How does the tree feel about what

happened?

7.

Do the clouds know what happened?
How does the tree feel about what happened?

8.

Does the boy (girl) know what happened?
How does the boy (girl) feel about what happened?

Story 2:
1.

2.

3.

Branch hits the car.

The branch hit the car; is it the tree's fault?
How is it the tree's fault?
Is it the car's fault?
How is it the car's fault?
Did the tree branch mean to hit the car?

4.

Should someone or something be punished for what
happened?
Who should be punished?
How should
they be punished?

5.

Do the coulds know what happened?
How do the clouds feel about what happened?

6.

Does the boy (girl) know what happened?
How does the boy (girl) feel about wha t

7.

happened.

Does the sun know what happened?
How does the sun feel about what happened?
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8.

Does the dog know w h a t happened?
How does the dog feel about what happened?

Story 3:

Child trips over the dog.

1.

The boy (girl) tripped over the dog; is it the
boy (girl's) fault?
How is it the boy's
(girl's) fault?

2.

Is it the dog's fault?
How is it the dog's fault?

3.

Did the dog mean to trip the boy

4.

Should someone or something be punished for what
happened?
Who should be punished?
How should
they be punished?

5.

Does the tree know w h a t happened?
How does the tree feel about w h a t happened?

6.

Do the clouds know wh a t happened?
How do the clouds feel about wha t happened?

7.

Does the car
How does the

know wh a t happened?
car feel about wha t happened?

8.

Does the sun
How does the

know wha t happened?
sun feel about wh a t happened?

(girl)?

After the third story inquiry S was asked specifically
if the 6 objects common to all 3 tasks were alive or not
alive.

The 6 objects were the sun, the clouds,

the tree, the dog, and the boy or girl.

the car,

Names of the 6

objects were typed on 2" by 3" cards and shuffled before
each presentation.

Positive and negative forms of the

question were alternated, with the positive form occurring
first.

The forms of the question were:

Is the _______ alive or is it not alive?
Is the

not alive or is it alive?
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Data Analysis
Validity and reliability of the experiments1 tasks.
Validity of the instruments used in this study rests on
two procedures.

First, the items were generated to re

flect the construct animism as defined.

Second, consis

tent response patterns by subjects on similar items on
the standardized instrument,

the Questionnaire test, and

the new instruments would reflect concurrent validity.
Animism,

as defined in this study is the attribution of

life to inanimate objects.

The Ss in the present research

were asked directly in each of three situations if objects
were alive or not alive.
High interjudge reliability for the Questionnaire
task was obtained by Laurendeau & Pinard.

These authors

and an independent judge classified 97% of the protocols
in the same stage

(Laurendeau & Pinard,

1962).

High retest

reliability for items on the Card Sort was reported in an
earlier section of this paper.

The Story Inquiry task

was not tested directly for consistency in responding, but
items for this instrument were assumed to be reliable on
the basis of results of the other 2 tasks.
Three additional statistical techniques were employed
to estimate item reliability across all 3 tasks, repre
senting some aspects of both construct validity and intra
subject reliability.

Two techniques wer e used to evaluate

intra-subject consistency in responding over the 3 tasks.
(1) Tetrachoric correlations

were calculated for items
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common to 2 or 3 of the experimental situations.

(2) As

an indication of response consistency over all 3 tasks,
instances of perfect response consistency for 6 items
common to all situations were tallied by age groups.

A

third technique was used to indicate if characteristics of
the stimulus items had some degree of consistency over the
3 situations.

Differences in proportions of Ss calling

each of 4 objects alive on the 3 tasks was interpreted as
situational independence of subject responses.

The 4

objects common to all modes of presentation were the sun,
clouds,
X*'.

tree, and car.

The proportions were tested by

The null hypothesis stated that there was no difference

among the tasks in the number of Ss responding "alive."
Examination of Task Equivalence
The first question posed by this research was the
extent to which animistic responses are situation and task
specific.

To shed some light on this question, a system

for scoring animism for each task was devised.

The scoring

criteria follow:
Questionnaire.
animistic response
be alive)

The protocols were scored such that an
(where an inanimate object was said to

received 1 point and a non-animistic response 0.

£ ' s animism score was the total number of items to which S
made an animistic response.

The maxi m u m number of points

was 14, the number of items which presented inanimate
objects.
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Card S o r t .

The score for the 31 items on this task

was calculated in a manner identical to the Questionnaire,
with the maximum number of points being 22.
Story I n q u i r y .

Individual scores for this task con

sisted of the number of affirmative replies given to the
following questions:
1.

Does the sun know what happened?

2.

Does the tree know what happened?

(Story 1)

3.

Do the clouds know what happened?

(Story 1)

4.

Do the clouds know what happened?

(Story 2)

5.

Does the sun know what happened?

6.

Does the tree know what happened?

(Story 3)

7.

Do the clouds know what happened?

(Story 3)

8.

Does the car know what happened?

(Story 3)

9.

Does the sun know what happened?

(Story 3)

10.

Is the sun alive

11.

Is the car alive?

12.

Are the clouds alive?

(Story 1)

(Story 2)

(End of last story)
(End of last story)
(End of last story)

The maximum number of points for this task was 12. Ani
m i s m scores were intercorrelated for the three tasks as
an index of task equivalence.
As a further test of the differential effect of tasks,
Questionnaire and Card Sort protocols were also rated as
to the stages achieved by Ss on each task.

On the basis

of data secured from 500 Ss, Laurendeau and Pinard

(1962)
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revised the stages of animism originally posited by
Piaget

(1929).

The 4 stages of animism formulated by

Laurendeau and Pinard we r e used to categorize Ss in the
current study on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort.
Two psychologists and the author working without consulta
tion used the following criteria to classify the proto
cols for each S on the Questionnaire.

These criteria are

Laurendeau and Pinard's descriptions of the thinking
typical of children in each stage of animism.
Stage 0:

Incomprehension or r e f u s a l .

This stage

comprises those Ss who could not understand the questions
or answered at random with o u t ever giving valid explana
tions.

Often a subject in Stage 0 will use the same

reason to attribute and deny life to objects,

thus illus

trating his ignorance of logical operations.

This results

in contradictions in the protocol,
prelogical thinking.

typical of infantile,

The child's "yes's" and "no's" often

seem to be independent of his explanations.
Stage 1:

Animistic Thinking Based on U s e f u l n e s s ,

A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m , or M o v e m e n t . Subjects in this stage com
mit errors of the animistic type by attributing life to
one or many inanimate objects.

These Ss use criteria

which are imperfect, but the authors remark on the con
sistency of the child's thinking.

"He never resorts to

the same reason to attribute or refuse life"
& Pinard,

1962, p. 145).

(Laurendeau

Frequently a combination of two

or even three of these criteria can be seen in explanations.
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Some children may refuse life to plants and trees by
reason that they do not move, or are perceived by the
child to be immobile.
Stage 2:
Thinking.

Autonomous Movement with Some Residual

This stage, characterized as one of transition,

is distinguished from Stage 1 by the discovery of 2 d i s 
tinct sources of movement.

Only one of these,

that is,

where the source of the movement is the object itself,
now serves as a criterion for life.

Laurendeau and Pinard

discuss how this criterion alone does not serve to cause
the total disappearance of animism.

Most importantly,

children continue for some time to delude themselves as
to the real source of movement, particularly wit h regard
to those objects most removed from direct experience,
as the wind, sun, moon, etc.

such

Another reason is that "the

discovery of autonomous movement does not definitely dis
place the inadequate or imperfect criteria of the first
stage.

In fact, the most frequent occurrence is that the

child relies upon autonomy to justify some of his responses,
but for the other responses still resorts frequently to
usefulness of objects,

to their possessing anthropomorphic

traits, or to their general movement.
this stage, however,
movement."

at least make a mention of autonomous

(Laurendeau & Pinard,

Stage 3:

All subjects of

1962, p. 147.)

Total Disappearance of Animistic T h i n k i n g .

Subjects in this stage never grant life to inanimate o b 
jects, at least to those listed in the Questionnaire.

The
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reverse of this is not true, that is, Ss often refuse
life to some animate objects,

especially plants, on the

basis of lack of autonomy and for anthropomorphic reasons.
Explanations given may be anthropomorphic, or based upon
usefulness or activity.
The complete set of instructions given to the judges
can be found in Appendix C.
Interjudge reliability of the classification system
was estimated by the extent of agreement among the 3
judges as to the stage of animistic thinking reflected in
responses.
cases

There was perfect agreement in 72% of the

(43) and ratings within 1 stage of agreement in 28%

of the cases

(17).

There was only 1 case where judges

differed by more than 1 stage.

These figures indicate

the classifying system to be adequate
study.

for purposes of this

The final stage assigned to each S was the mea n of

the 3 judges'

ratings.

Determination of the stages of animism achieved on
the Card Sort involved employment of the following criteria.
Stage 0:

If an S placed 2 or fewer animate objects

in the "alive" category or 4 or fewer inanimate objects
in the "not alive" category,

then S's sorting was considered

random and done without any comprehension of the concept.
Stage 1:

An £ was placed in the Stage 1 category if

he committed one or more errors in the "alive",
movement", and the "movement" categories.

"autonomous

Further, if

additional errors were made in the "movement" category but
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not in the "autonomous movement" classification,
judged to be in Stage 1.

was

An error was defined as placing

an inanimate object in the animate category.
Stage 2:

If the £ made one or more errors in the

"alive" and the "autonomous movement" categories, he was
classified as being in Stage 2.

If the same inanimate

objects were called both "moving" and "autonomously moving",
S_ was judged to be in this stage.

Further,

if one or

more of the inanimate objects called not alive were put
in the "not autonomously moving" category,

S_ was placed

in Stage 2.
Stage 3:

If no errors were made in the "alive" cate

gory, S was placed in Stage 3, regardless of whether
errors were made in other sorts.
A comparison of stages reached by the Ss on the
Questionnaire and the Card Sort was made by tabulating the
frequencies of each occurrence and converting to a p r o 
portion of the total cases.
An inspection of the data on the 3 tasks was made to
see if animism decreased with increasing concreteness of
the stiumlus mode.
Effect of Age and Sex on Animism
To examine the question of whether there are differ
ences in the amount of animism as a function of age and
sex, an analysis of variance using animism scores was
calculated for each of the 3 tasks.
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Many of the analyses in the present study dealt
with the Ss' internal consistency in responding.

Because

some researchers in the past have utilized a quantitative
approach to each item, percentages of animistic errors
were tallied for each age level for each inanimate object
listed on the Questionnaire,
Inquiry.

the Card Sort, and the Story

This allowed a more direct comparison of the

present data with previous findings.
Analysis of Criteria for Life
Several content analyses of responses to the Ques
tionnaire and the Story Inquiry wer e completed to examine
the criteria Ss used to attribute life.
related answers to the general items

Another technique

on the

Question

naire to the stage rating achieved.
To permit a visual comparison of the association
between aliveness and movement, and between aliveness and
autonomous movement,

instances of Ss placing inanimate

objects of the Card Sort in 8 comparison categories were
tallied.

The paired-variable groupings included:

and moving, not alive and not moving,

alive

alive and not moving,

not alive and moving, alive and autonomously moving,
alive and not autonomously moving,

not

alive and not autono

mously moving, and not alive and autonomously moving.
inanimate objects on the Card Sort are listed on page
The frequencies were then exhibited by age groups.

The
30.

RESULTS
Reliability of the Experimental Tasks
In comparing the performance of Ss on 3 tasks, an
area of initial importance is that of cross method reliabi
lity of individual items.

Are there indications that each

task was independent of the others?

What evidence is there

that responses to individual items were sufficiently con
sistent to warrant judgments concerning the conceptual
development of Ss in terms of animism?
An affirmative response to the former question comes
from the data concerning the proportion of total Ss
calling each of four objects alive across the three tasks.
These proportions were analyzed in terms of chi square
2
(X ), the values of which are presented in Table I.

TABLE I
CHI SQUARE

(X2 ) VALUES FO R TOTAL Ss

CALLING OBJECTS "ALIVE" AS A FUNCTION OF TASK

Object

X2

_P

.59

.80

clouds

3.25

.20

tree

2.18

.50

.91

.70

sun

car
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None of the values in Table I reached the level of
statistical significance,

indicating the differences in

the proportion of Ss calling an item alive on one task as
compared with either of the other tasks could be attribut
ed to chance.

Note that this calculation analyzed a

specific characteristic of the objects,
"aliveness",

i.e., their

as opposed to later analyses which deal with

response consistency,

the extent to which Ss responded

similarily to the same items in different contexts regard
less of whether they perceived them as "alive" or "not
alive".
Two techniques measured consistency of responses to
common items across tasks.

Tetrachoric correlations,

used to estimate intra-subject consistency for items
across tasks, are presented in Table II.
As shown in Table II, significant intra-subject
response consistency was found for 15 of the 20 items
shared by the Questionnaire and the Card Sort.

Intra

subject agreement was significant for 5 of the 6 ob
jects common to the Questionnaire and the Story Inquiry
and all 6 items appearing jointly on the Story Inquiry
and the Card Sort.

In general,

the tendency of the

child to regard an object either animistically or
realistically generalized across the methods of presen
tation.
A more rigorous test of response consistency involved
a tabulation of the instances of perfect agreement for
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TABLE II
TETRACHORIC CORRELATIONS (rt ) FOR
COMMON ITEM RESPONSES FOR A LL Ss

Item

Questionnaire
& Card Sort

Task
Questionnaire &
Story Inquiry

Story Inquiry
& Card Sort

mountain

.71 **

table

.50 **

cat

.79 **

lamp

.24

bird

.17

fly

.52 **

flower

.67 **

watch

.32 *

bell

.54 **

plane

.36 **

fire

. 37 **

rain

.45 **

snake

.41 **

fish

.09

child

.66 **

.68 **

.68 **

dog

.26 *

.15

. 33 **

tree

.36 **

.58 **

.41 **

sun

.15

.26 *

.36 **

car

.67 **

.31 *

.46 **

cloud

.20

.35 **

.57 **

* p < .05, df = 58
** p < .01, df = 58
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items across all 3 tasks.
3 tasks.

Six items were common to all

Therefore, each S had 6 opportunities to agree

perfectly;

the total possible instances of agreement for

each age group was 120.

The proportions and percentages

reflecting occurrences of identical intra-subject respond
ing by age groups are shown in Table III.

TABLE III
INSTANCES OF PERFECT INTRA-SUBJECT
AGREEMENT F O R COMMON ITEMS ACROSS 3 TASKS BY
AGE GROUPS

Proportion

Percent

3-year-olds

44/120

37

4-year-olds

55/120
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5-year-olds

70/120

58

Age Group

The increase of consistent responding with age
indicates that the Ss become more reliable in their
responses,

and that in each of the 3 tasks common elements

were presented,

an index of construct validity.

For, if

the tasks were not measuring a single internalized con
cept, Ss would have become less consistent as their di s 
criminatory abilities developed with age.
Task Equivalence
Analyses were completed to yield information about
the effect of differing stimulus modes on the elicitation
of an equivalent class of responses.

The 3 tasks
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employed in the present study differed in the degree
of abstraction of the stimulus presentation.
tionnaire provided a verbal presentation,
a pictorial representation,

The Que s 

the Card Sort

and the Story Inquiry a three-

dimensional model.
Performances on the Questionnaire,

the Card Sort,

and the Story Inquiry tasks were evaluated to yield an
animism score for each.

As an indication of the effect

of different stimulus modes upon the elicitation of ani
mistic responses,

these animism scores were intercorrelat

ed using Pearson's r as shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV
INTERCORRELATIONS (r) OF ANIMISM
SCORES F O R A L L Ss ON THREE TASKS

Questionnaire

Questionnaire

.5292 **

Story Inquiry

** £

Card Sort

.4109 **

.3995 **

< .01, df = 58

All three correlations in Table IV are statistically
significant.

Furthermore, the magnitudes of the inter

correlations indicate that a construct of animism as
defined in this study is tenable.
One approach to measuring task equivalence is to
focus on the apparent dissimilarities of the three tasks.
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To determine whether animism decreased with increasing
concreteness of the stimulus form, a tabulation was made
of instances where S called an inanimate object alive on
the Questionnaire or on the Questionnaire and the Card
Sort, but denied it life on the Story Inquiry task.
year-olds evidenced this 16 times,
and 5-year-olds 13 times.

Three-

4-year-olds 11 times,

These data are not sufficient

to establish a statistical trend, but the small differences
with increasing age are in the predicted direction.
In the final test of task equivalence performances
on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort were compared.

On

the basis of responses to items on these 2 tasks, each £
was assigned to a "stage" of animism.

Stages of animism

achieved by £s on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort
were compared by construction of a matrix placing each £
on the basis of his rated stage of animism on the Card
Sort and the Questionnaire,

as shown in Table V.

TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF AL L Ss IN EACH STAGE OF
ANIMISM ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE CARD SORT

Questionnaire
Card Sort

Stage 0

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 0

10

2

Stage 1

4

10

6

Stage 2

5

4

5

7

2

2

3

Stage 3
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Inspection of Table V reveals that 28 Ss achieved
identical stages on the 2 tasks.

Fifteen £s were rated

higher on the Questionnaire than on the Card Sort, whereas
17 £s obtained higher ratings on the Card Sort than on
the Questionnaire.

Of the Ss placed in a different stage

on the 2 tasks, about half of these were rated higher on
the Card Sort, and half higher on the Questionnaire,
indicating measurement error, but not bias.

That half

of the total £s were rated at the same stage on both
tasks provides additional evidence that the construct of
animism as defined in this study was being reliably
measured across tasks.
Animism as a Function of Age and Sex
To examine the question of whether there are di f 
ferences in the amount of animism as a function of age
and sex, a 2 X 6 analysis of variance was calculated for
each task using animism scores.

A significant age effect

was obtained as shown in Tables VI, VII, and VIII.
TABLE VI
2 X 6 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY
TABLE F O R THE QUESTIONNAIRE TASK
Source

Sum of
Squares

590.80
Age
Sex
8.06
Interaction
65.94
Within
1099.60
1764.40
Total

df

Mean
Square

5 101.96
1
8.06
5 13.19
22.91
48
59

F

4.45
. 35
. 58

Significance

<.01
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TABLE VII
2 X 6 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY
TABLE FOR THE CARD SORT TASK

Source

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Age

1026.28

5

205.26

6.09

Sex

30.81

1

30.81

.91

364.69

5

72.94

2.16

Within

1618.80

48

33.73

Total

3040.58

59

Interaction

F

Significance

<.01

TABLE VIII
2 X 6 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY
TABLE FOR THE STORY INQUIRY TASK

df

Mean
Square

304.68

5

60.97

3.77

.81

1

.81

.05

90.69

5

18.19

1.12

776.40

48

16.18

1172.58

59

Source

Sum of
Squares

Age
Sex
Interaction
Within
Total

F

Significance

<.01
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To provide information on individual items, animis
tic errors were tallied for each age level and for each
inanimate object listed on the 3 tasks,

as presented in

Tables IX, X, and XI.

TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE
QUESTIONNAIRE

Item

3 -year-olds

Age , ,
4 -year-olds

5-year-olds

Mean %

wind

85

55

40

60.0

cloud

85

50

35

56.7

bell

75

45

35

51.7

airplane

80

40

30

50.0

fire

70

45

35

50.0

sun

65

45

35

48.3

rain

70

40

35

48. 3

car

70

45

20

45.0

mountain

80

40

5

41.7

watch

65

40

20

41.7

bicycle

75

40

10

41.7

pencil

85

35

5

41.7

lamp

70

40

10

40.0

table

70

40

5

38.3

range

65-85

35-55

5-40

38.3-60.0
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TABLE X
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE CARD SORT

3-year-olds

Age
4-year-olds

5-year-olds

Mean %

rain

60

55

30

48.3

airplane

70

45

25

46.7

jack-in-box

75

35

25

45.0

sun

55

50

30

45.0

smoke

70

30

30

43.3

doll

65

40

25

43. 3

cloud

50

40

40

43.3

motorcycle

65

40

20

41.7

fire

65

30

30

41.7

watch

55

45

25

41.7

broken tri
cycle

60

45

15

40.0

T.V.

65

35

20

40.0

car

65

35

20

40.0

lamp

60

45

10

38. 3

bell

60

30

20

36.7

knife

55

35

20

36.7

broken dish

60

35

10

35.0

table

60

30

15

35.0

mountain

60

40

5

35.0

broken pencil

60

25

15

33. 3

crayon

45

40

10

31.7

broken glasses 60

20

10

30.0

5-40

30.0-48.

range

45-75

20-55
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TABLE XI
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE STORY INQUIRY

Item

3 -year-olds

Age
4 -year-olds

Mean %

5 -year-olds

sun

65

50

35

50. 0

car

75

40

30

48. 3

clouds

60

40

30

43.3

60-75

range

40-50

30-35

43. 3-50.1

These data indicate that the tendency to attribute
life to an inanimate object decreases consistently with
age for all 3 tasks.

The percentages indicate that the

younger children made more animistic errors than did
older children.

The age trend was more clearly seen on

the Questionnaire than on the Card Sort or the Story
Inquiry,

supporting the evidence reported earlier that

animism decreases slightly with increasing stimulus
concreteness.
A comparison of the ranks of the mean percentages of
Questionnaire objects in Table IX with similar data from
Laurendeau and Pinard's

(1962)

study of the same items

revealed a statistically significant correlation
(rho = .8652, p

< .005, df = 12).

Laurendeau and Pinard's
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sample included Ss from 4 to 12 years old, while the
present study used 3-to 5-year-olds.

Criteria for Life
The purpose of this section is to elucidate evidence
regarding criteria Ss used to decide whether an object
was alive or not alive.
Before focusing on the criteria for life used by
S s , the characteristic responses of Ss at various stages
of animistic thinking will be summarized.

Responses to

the general questioning of the Questionnaire for Ss at
various rated stages of animism on the Questionnaire were
examined.

A majority of Ss categorized as being in Stage

0 answered the questions with irrelevant remarks, or said
"I don't know".
be alive)?"

An example is "What does it mean

"Bathing suits."

things which are alive."

(to

"Give me the name of some

"Houses, paper."

This S

pro

ceeded to say that an object was alive because it "likes
to be alive."
Most Ss in Stages 1, 2, and 3 said they did not know
what it meant to be alive.

However,

they responded

correctly when asked to name some things which were
living.

Table XII indicates the number of Ss in each

stage responding to the general questioning in each of
5 ways.
Table XII reveals that although there is some cor
respondence between a S's ability to give a reasonably
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TABLE XII
FREQUENCY OF Ss IN EACH STAGE RESPONDING TO THE
GENERAL QUESTIONS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
IN FIVE CLASSIFIABLE WAYS

Stages
0

1

2

3

9

3

1

0

Replied "I don't know"*
but named inanimate
objects **
3

0

0

0

Replied "I don't know"*
but named both
inanimate and animate
objects **
1

1

0

0

Replied "I don't know"*
but named animate
objects **
6

12

9

8

2

3

2

No comprehension

Gave a reasonably
correct explanation +

0

* to the questions "Do you know what it is to be alive,
to be living?" and "What does it mean?"
** when asked "Give me the name of some things which are
alive."
+ "reasonably correct explanation" included mention of
any of the biological traits of aliveness, such as
"eats", "grows", etc.
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correct explanation of what it means to be alive and his
actual attribution of aliveness to objects,

caution is

needed in seeking clues to cognitive development in
young children.
Several examinations of the data were made to inves
tigate what criteria Ss used in attributing life.

An

inspection of the response content to the test items of
the Questionnaire provided some insight into the hy p o 
thetical rationales Ss utilized in making their decisions.
Protocols were categorized as being primarily in one of
three groups:

(1) no comprehension,

cial characteristics of the object,
functional characteristic.

(2) use of superfi
and

(3) use of a

The frequencies by age

groups for each of these groupings are shown in Table XIII.

TABLE XIII
FREQUENCIES BY AGE GROUP OF QUESTIONNAIRE
PROTOCOLS IN EACH OF THREE GROUPINGS
WITH REGARD TO RATIONALE CONTENT

Age
Group

No
Superficial
Comprehens ion Characteristics

Functional
Characteristics

3-year-olds

11

3

6

4-year-olds

4

2

13

5-year-olds

2

0

17

Two of the protocols exhibited approximately equal
portions of 2 or more groupings and thus were not
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included in Table XIII.

Very few of the protocols were

entirely within the definition of one grouping.

However,

the majority of responses in each protocol used 1 type
of rationale.
In

the No

"I don't know"

Comprehension group some of the £s said
or refused to answer.

Other responses

placed in this category included "because it likes to be
alive",
As

and "because my
can be

mom

said

seen in Table XIII,

(it is alive)."
few Ss utilized the

superficial characteristics of an object to decide if it
was alive or not.

This category included such responses

as "it has no feet",

"because it is out there", and

"because it is yellow".

Another type of response given

several times appears to be s u p e r f i c i a l :

"when we open

a light it is alive and wh e n we close it, it's not
alive".

This £ is exhibiting the idea that movement is

crucial; when something is moving
function)

it is alive

(or is performing a

(of value to u s ) , but when it is

not moving or performing a useful function it is not
alive.

This reasoning,

in the Piagetian view,

from the eogcentricity of the child's thinking.

arises
He is

the center of the universe and all other objects are
there to serve him.
Included in the functional grouping of responses to
the question "why do you say it is alive?"

are comments

on the moral as well as physical attributes of objects.
Examples of this type of reasoning are "because it can
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included in Table XIII.

Very few of the protocols were

entirely within the definition of one grouping.

However,

the majority of responses in each protocol used 1 type
of rationale.
In

the No

"I don't know"

Comprehension group some of the Ss said
or refused to answer.

Other responses

placed in this category included "because it likes to be
alive",
As

and "because my
can be

m om

said

(it is alive)."

seen in Table XIII, few £s utilized the

superficial characteristics of an object to decide if it
was alive or not.

This category included such responses

as "it has no feet",

"because it is out there", and

"because it is yellow".

Another type of response given

several times appears to be superficial:

"when we open

a light it is alive and when we close it, it's not
alive".

This S_ is exhibiting the idea that movement is

crucial; when something is moving
function)

it is alive

(or is performing a

(of value to u s ) , but when it is

not moving or performing a useful function it is not
alive.

This reasoning,

in the Piagetian view, arises

from the eogcentricity of the child's thinking.

He is

the center of the universe and all other objects are
there to serve him.
Included in the functional grouping of responses to
the question "why do you say it is alive?"

are comments

on the moral as well as physical attributes of objects.
Examples of this type of reasoning are "because it can
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f l y " , "because it can r a i n - d r o p " , "because people can go
up the mountain", and "because it can snap you".

Again,

in this group we see responses indicating that the value of
an object can determine its aliveness.
Frequently an £ using functional characteristics for
most items would refer to superficial characteristics in
attributing life to a few objects.

£ #37 said the bell

was alive "because it rings", the airplane,
flies in the sky", the tree,
this

"because it has a stem like

(gesturing)", and the mountain,

of dirt".

"because it

"because it has lots

Other children used relevant functions of

objects to attribute life and employed superficial char
acteristics of other objects in explaining why they were
not alive.

£ #47, for example,

said a bird was alive

"because it can fly", whereas a tree was not alive "because
it has leaves on it" and a mountain was not"because there's
dirt on i t " .
Another £ imparted "will" and a sense of freedom to
objects:

many things were called alive because they "can

go wherever they want to" or "you can ride them wherever
you want to".
For some older £s, having a function is necessary but
not sufficient for life.

Subjects often discriminated

among possible functions, accepting some and discarding
others as criteria for granting aliveness.

One £ said a

tree was alive "because it g r o w s " , whereas the wind is
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not alive "because it's just wind.

. . it blows".

This

same S said a bird is alive because "it brings good luck".
Even though responses to the Questionnaire items lent
themselves to a degree of content categorization,

this

author is still impressed with the highly individualistic
rationales Ss utilized in the attribution or denial of
life.
Further evidence regarding the basis for animism
comes from an analysis of responses to the Story Inquiry
items.

Piaget said that children consider objects to

act intentionally.

Objects on the Story Inquiry which

elicited 53 responses indicating intentional activity
also obtained 39 responses indicating attribution of life.
The older £s showed a marked decrease in the tendency to
call an action intentional,

correctly perceiving the

stories as depicting accidental situations.
interesting to note, however,

It is

that 55 Ss attributed blame

or fault at least once in the 3 stories.

Many of the

younger £[s found both participants at fault.

Likewise,

Ss of all ages stated that punishment should be adminis
tered in 85 instances,

57 of these involving objects

which the £ also called alive on the same task.

Only 14

Ss who laid blame for an action failed to indicate
punishment was in order in at least 1 of the stories.
it seems that regardless of whether an object acted
intentionally, punishment for the deed was often called
for, even by the older Ss.

So,
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After indicating that one of the inanimate objects
"knew” what had happened in a story, many of the younger
Ss responded to the additional query with a comment on
the function of that object.

For example, when asked how

the sun felt about what had happened, one £ replied "it
burns y o u " .
emotion,

Older Ss were able to speak in terms of

such as "feels mad", or "feels badly", or "he's

sad".
To focus on a specific hypothetical criterion S>s
might use to attribute life, the Card Sort data were ana
lyzed in several ways.

The association between movement

and aliveness was evaluated by tabulating instances where
Ss attributed both movement and aliveness to 22 inanimate
Card Sort items.

Also tallied were occurrences of an item

being labeled "alive and no movement",
movement",

"not alive and no

and "not alive and movement".

The percentages

of each type of occurrence are presented by age group in
Figure 1.
It is evident from Figure 1 that 3-year-olds called
more inanimate objects alive, regardless of whether m o v e 
ment was also attributed.

With increasing age there was

a decreasing tendency to call something alive unless it
also moved.

However, S were more likely, wi t h increasing

age, to attribute movement but not aliveness to inanimate
objects.
clear:

The picture of this phenomenon is remarkably
movement appears to serve as one criterion of
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Figure 1.

Percentages by age groups of placement of 22
inanimate Card Sort objects into the categories
of Alive-Movement (A-M) , not Alive-no Movement
(not A-no M ) , Alive-no Movement (A-no M ) , and
not Alive-Movement (not A - M ) .
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aliveness for younger Ss, but is a less critical determi
nant for older £s.
Four of the 22 inanimate objects on the Card Sort
were broken or smashed.
tricycle, glasses,

These items were the dish,

and pnecil, and were included in the

task to test an hypothesis of differential responding to
these items as compared with objects in good physical
condition.

The percentage of Ss by age group placing

broken objects as opposed to non-broken objects in the
combinations of the alive and movement categories are
presented in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE OF Ss BY AGE GROUPS CLASSIFYING
BROKEN AND NON-BROKEN INANIMATE CARD SORT
OBJECTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CATEGORIES
OF ALIVENESS AND MOVEMENT

Category Pair

3-year-olds
Objects
Broken

NonBroken

Age Groups
4-year-olds
Objects
Broken

5-year-olds
Objects

Non- Broken NonBroken
Broken

Alive-Movement

30

37

7

15

2

13

Not Alive -No
Movement

31

24

54

39

75

41

Alive-No Movement

30

24

24

24

10

9

9

14

15

22

13

37

Not AliveMovement
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Table XIV reveals that the joint attribution of not
alive-no movement was strikingly differential for broken
objects as compared to intact objects.

Although the

difference is small with the 3-year-olds,

4-and especially

5-year-olds demonstrated a marked tendency to identify the
broken objects as unable to move and not alive.
With the exception of analyses dealing with intra
subject consistency,

little has been reported to this

point about S s ' performance on items presenting living
objects.

The Card Sort data is representative of the way

Ss perceived animate objects as tested in the present
study.
Performances of Ss with regard to the 9 animate
objects on the Card Sort in relation to aliveness and
movement are presented in Table XV. .
TABLE XV
FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES OF INSTANCES
Ss BY AGE GROUP PLACED ANIMATE OBJECTS
ON THE CARD SORT INTO ALIVE AN D MOVEMENT CATEGORIES

Age Group
Category Pair

3-year-olds
Freq.
%

4-year-olds
Freq.
%

5-year-olds
Preq.
%

Alive-Movement

98

54

118

66

128

71

Not Alive-No
Movement

17

9

20

11

16

9

Alive-No Movement

23

13

26

14

24

13

Not Alive-Movement

42

23

16

9

12

7
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These data indicate that with increasing age there
developed an improved ability to correctly discriminate
animate objects as being alive and capable of movement.
With increasing age is also seen a declining in responses
labeling something not alive that was perceived as able
to move.

The joint category of not alive-no movement is

of special interest:

47 out of 53 responses from all £s

in this category dealt with the flower or the tree.
general,
objects:

In

the picture is reversed for animate and inanimate
there was a decreasing tendency with age to

call an inanimate object alive and capable of movement,
whereas there was an increasing tendency to attribute
life and movement to animate objects.

And, more S s , with

increasing age, attributed movement but not life to non
living objects, but reversed this tendency for animate
objects.
A final analysis of the Card Sort data was completed
to examine whether there was a greater association between
aliveness and autonomous movement as opposed to aliveness
and movement,

regardless of the source.

Figure 2 presents

the placement of 22 inanimate Card Sort objects for the
categories of autonomous movement and aliveness.

Separat

ing the data by age groups enables an inspection of the
effect of age on this association.

Figure 2 shows that

3-year-olds associated aliveness with autonomous movement
to a remarkable degree.

In part,

this association may

be attributed to the positive response sets manifested

70

60

A-AM

50

not A-no A M
A-no A M

i
I

not A - A M

40

Percent

>.V

i*
W l

30

20

10

i
1

I

i

I
iVV

SS
SS
w
SS
SS
■•vl

I
$

iV»

©

|s
&>

Si
3-year-olds

4-year-olds

ULU.

1

'V
SS

5-year-old s

Age

Figure 2.

Percentages by age groups of placement of 22
inanimate Card Sort objects into the categories
of Alive-Autonomous Movement (A-AM), not Aliveno Autonomous Movement (not A-no A M ) , Aliveno Autonomous Movement (A-no A M ) , and not
Alive-Autonomous Movement (not A - A M ) .
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by at least 3 Ss.

A more meaningful distribution is found

among the 4- and 5-year olds.

The first 2 bars of each

age group indicate a substantial amount of association
between aliveness and autonomous movement.

The last

bar, that of "not alive-autonomous movement" is somewhat
surprising.

This suggests Ss might be willing to attri

bute life-like qualities to objects but would stop short
of attributing life itself.
true of a d u l t s :

This, of course,

is also

witness our use of animism by poetic

license in everyday speech.

A comparison of Figures 1 and

2 indicates that, with increasing age, the changes in fre
quencies of all categories are in the same direction.
That is, there is a decreasing tendency to attribute life
to an inanimate object unless it is additionally capable
of movement or autonomous movement.

At the same time,

however, £s exhibit an increasing willingness to grant
movement of either kind without also attributing life.

DISCUSSION

Investigations into the nature of the child's con
ception of aliveness have raised a number of issues.
Among the debated topics are
cept of animism:

(1) the reality of the con

is the thinking of the child qualitative

ly different from that of the adult?,
cept:

(2) the stage con

does the development of non-animistic thought

occur in a series of recognizable stages?,
equivalence:

(3) task

is animism merely an artifact of the

experimental situation typically used for its measurement?,
(4) evidence regarding the existence of animism:
behaviors constitute animism?

what

What effect does grouped

as opposed to individual item analysis have on the
amount of animism judged to be present?,
basis of animism:

and

(5) the

what attributes does the child use in

designating animate and inanimate objects alive or not
alive?
The present study has provided information on each
of these issues.

The discussion which follows involves

an overlapping of issues and evidence as each topic is
interwoven with the others.

Animism as a Construct
One line of thinking about animism,
original formulation,

following P i a g e t s

regards animistic thinking as a
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useful description of a process of congitive development.
The other, proposed by Huang and others, maintains that
there is no unique state of precausal thinking in the
young child.

The Piagetian regards the young child as

fusing the two worls of himself and external reality,
resulting in total egocentrism.

Gradually,

the character

istics of these two worlds become differentiated and
notions about each develop which replace earlier thoughts.
Thus, child thought is seen to be qualitatively different
from that of the adult.
Those opposing the reality of animism hold that
instead of an elaborate set of precausal ideation, a
neutral or undetermined state exists, characterized by
a lack of ideas about the nature of the self or the
world.

Then gradually, as more information is accumulated,

the child approaches adult thought, a quantitative
process

(Huang, 1943; Klingberg,

1957).

In support of

the notion of the existence of a state of ignorance,
Huang

(1943) claimed that young children answer at random

and frequently change their responses when new suggestions
are made.
The present study provides information on both quali
tative and quantitative differences with age.

In general,

quantitative measures include numerical tabulation of
animistic errors, i.e., attributing life to inanimate
objects.

Qualitative indices involve the reasoning
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behind such decisions, the ideational process underlying
the labeling of objects as alive or not alive.
Although the current research did not directly c om
pare child and adult thinking, age trends were found that
could be theoretically extrapolated.

Support for extra

polation is provided by significant correlations between
rankings of identical Questionnaire items used in this
research and Laurendeau and Pinard's

(1962)

study with

Ss through 12 years of age.
Analyses indicating quantitative differences among
Ss in the current research utilized the frequencies of
animistic errors by age groups for individual i t e m s , and
within each of the three tasks.
Both measures showed decreases in animism with in
creasing age.

The tabulation of animistic errors for

individual items on each of the three tasks revealed that
3-year-olds consistently called more inanimate objects
alive more often than 4-or 5-year-olds.

Huang and other

opponents of the precausality notion have reported that
individual item analysis failed to exhibit signs of a ni
mism.

Their analysis was conducted in a manner similar

to the individual item analyses carried out in the
present study.

The ranges of animistic errors for £s

in this research show that every age group called each
inanimate object alive some of the time.

The percentages

for the 3-year-olds were higher than the 4-and 5-year-
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olds on all three tasks.

The evidence suggests some

animistic thinking is present at all age levels sampled.
The second quantitative measure employed animism
scores assigned to Ss for each of the three tasks.

An a 

lyses of variance using these scores indicated that age
was the only significant factor in accounting for dif
ferences in performances on each of the three tasks.

The

finding of no differential response between boys and girls
is in agreement with previous studies

(Russell,

1940a).

Qualitative differences are exhibited in the ration
ales Ss used to call inanimate objects alive.

In general,

younger Ss often relied on capricious reasons while older
Ss developed an awareness of the movement of objects
and, further, of autonomous energy.

At the oldest age

levels in this study there is evidence of the beginning
of an adult biological definition of life, such as "it
breathes, eats", etc.
Qualitative differences over age were indicated by
the stages of animism assigned on the basis of Question
naire and Card Sort data.

Stages for the Questionnaire

were assigned by a standardized qualitative analysis of
response content.

As might be expected, higher cognitive

levels were found more frequently for older children.
Other qualitative differences were shown by the
kinds of object characteristics mentioned by the child.
With increasing age fewer Ss used capricious reasons or
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superficial characteristics to label an object alive,
whereas the use of functional characteristics increased.
Analyses of the Story Inquiry data indicated younger
£s attributed intention to objects more often than older
Ss, sometimes blaming both participants of the story.
This supports Piaget's theory of egocentricism, whereby
the young child cannot conceive of unconscious action.
Age differences were found in the association of
aliveness and movement, determined by performance on the
Card Sort.

There is a decreasing tendency to attribute

life to an inanimate object unless it is additionally
capable of movement.

At the same time, however, Ss ex

hibit an increasing willingness to grant movement without
also attributing life.
Both quantitative and qualitative measures strength
ened the notion that fewer inanimate objects are called
alive with increasing age, an hypothesis generally sup
ported by all previous investigations regardless of
theoretical persuasion of the experimenter.

Characteris

tics of objects which young children initially used in
decision making changed with increasing age.

This change

was such that the two characteristics could not be
simultaneously applied, thus a qualitative shift had
occurred.
The picture of the young child's mind existing in
ignorance or in a void of some type fails to provide a
useful alternative to Piaget's theory of indifferentiation,
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as pointed out by Jahoda

(1958a).

Although both quantita

tive and qualitative change theories are tenable,

looking

at the "why's" of the child's responses appears more p ro
ductive in analyzing the process of cognitive development.
The Stage Concept
Pertinent to the above discussion of qualitative and
quantitative differences between child and adult thought
is the notion of stages as descriptive of the growth
process.

Theories which deny the existence of animistic

thought contend that children progress from a state of
relative ignorance to one of better and better knowledge.
Empirical proof for this incremental process seems out
of reach.

The positive view of animism hypothesizes that

growth occurs in recognizable stages, each stage being a
transformation of previous stages rather than a simple
incorporation of additional concepts.
Information gained from the perspective of direct
observation of children enabled Piaget to categorize the
development of the concept of aliveness into four stages.
These were redefined by Laurendeau and Pinard

(1962) and

their stages were employed in the present study.

Stage 0

includes Ss who show no comprehension of the concept for
various reasons.

Stage 1 £s appear to use such criteria

as whether an object is in good condition, can be used
for some purpose,

is capable of movement, or has some

traits typically associated with humans.

Stage 2 is one

of transition, where Ss employ the idea of autonomous

78

movement as the criterial variable.

Stage 3 is marked

by the total disappearance of animistic thought, where
no inanimate objects are called alive.
Included in the theory that questions the existence
of animism is the challenge that if it does indeed exist,
then all 3-year-old children should exhibit signs of
being completely animistic,

that is, calling all inanimate

objects alive all of the time.

If this does not occur,

according to this line of reasoning,

then the existence

of animistic thought has not been proven.
cal stance seems untenable.

This theoreti

Although Piaget set age ranges

for his stages of animism, he carefully noted that these
were approximations only,

that not all 3 year-olds neces

sarily would be in Stage 0 or 1.

Stages of physical

development certainly do not occur at the same time for
every child.

Piaget would hypothesize, however,

that

each child goes through the stages of animism sequentially,
albeit at varying speeds as compared with other children.
In the present study Ss were classified into one
of four stages of animism on the basis of Questionnaire
data.

Further,

reasonable correspondence was achieved

between rated stages on the Questionnaire and on the Card
Sort, the classification system being applied to that
task as well.

Although longitudinal studies involving

repeated measurement of the same £ over time would
provide conclusive evidence regarding sequential con
stancy of s t a g e s , the present study found that the
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frequency of £s in the higher stages of animism increased
with age.
An indication of the validity of the stages in terms
of a more general concept of aliveness was demonstrated
in relating performance on the general questioning of
the Questionnaire task to the rated stage of animism.

A

majority of the Ss were unable to give an explanation of
what it meant to be alive, but correctly named some things
that were alive.

Of this group of S s , most were classi

fied in Stages 1, 2, or 3.

It appears, therefore,

that

the ability to express a general concept of what it is to
be alive seldom occurs before age 6.

However,

the results

do not mean that all children below this are uniformly ani
mistic or non-animistic.

Rather, there occur gradations

of response patterns reflecting specific levels of cog
nitive operation definable by criteria peculiar to each
stage.
Incremental growth could be described as the incorpora
tion of "bits" of information much like computer theory
(Safier, 1964).

These "bits", presumably, would be

specific instances,

such as "a chair is not alive".

An y 

thing more generalizable would approach a stage theory,
where concept formation would be described as the vehicle
of change.

Therefore,

if growth were incremental,

the

possibility of being able to reliably classify 60 Ss into
four stages of animism characterized by specific criteria,
but not specific instances, would seem to be remote.

In
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sum, evidence from the present study would support the
developmental sequence of discrete stages as being the
most parsimonious explanation of behavior at this point
in the investigation of animism.
Task Equivalence
Some investigators have argued that the concept of
animism is not useful in describing cognitive growth.
They claim that the artificial nature of the experimental
situation typically used to measure animism has instead
created the tendency for young children to give nonnaturalistic answers.

The Questionnaire technique e m 

ployed by Piaget has been criticized by Huang and others
on the ground that verbal techniques used with young
children are difficult to evaluate.

The latter research

ers argue that if enough leading questions are pursued,
a child is likely to give some animistic answers.
In order to test the validity of this argument,
three tasks were employed in the present study; one of
these was the standardized verbal questionnaire test.

Two

additional tests were used that dealt wit h many of the same
items in more concrete forms.
was asked "Is the

In all three tasks the £

a l i v e ? " , thus controlling the

semantic factor discussed by Looft and Bartz

(1969).

It

was hypothesized that as an object changes from verbal,
to pictorial,

to life-like model presentations,

one could

safely assume that the child would share an increased
knowledge of the object.

Therefore,

if children exhibit
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marked animism on the Questionnaire
less on the Card Sort

(verbal stimuli)

but

(pictorial p r e s e n t a t i o n s ) , and even

less on a Story Inquiry task

(life-like m o d e l s ) , then the

claim of Huang and associates that animism is but an
artifact of the experimental situation would be sup
ported.
The present study revealed a moderate degree of con
sistency of responses to identical objects presented in
three forms.
correlated,

Animism scores for each task were positively
and there was significant intra-subject agree

ment on a majority of items across paired tasks.

There

was no difference in the proportion of total Ss calling
each of four objects alive on all three tasks,
task equivalence.

indicating

Furthermore, classification of Ss on

Questionnaire protocols into one of four stages of animism
were found to be closely related to the stages in which
they were placed on the Card Sort task.

Finally,

the

impression of the writer confirms the statistical findings.
The writer was continually impressed with the strength of
the child's convictions;

each S^ conveyed an individualis

tic opinion about the life of objects and held to it
doggedly across all three experimental tasks.

Admittedly,

there was no direct attempt to persuade Ss to change
their opinions.

However, if responses had been random

or without adherence to a general conceptual framework,
it would seem that the repeated question "Is the _____
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alive?" would have yielded markedly different results
over the three tasks.
Two sources of evidence from the current research
supported the contention that verbal presentation of
the stimuli contributes to the presence of animism.

The

first involves analyzing the effect the degree of ab
straction of the stimuli had on the elicitation of ani
mistic responses.

More 3-year-olds than 4-or 5-year-

olds called an inanimate object "alive" on the Question
naire and then denied life to the same object on the Card
Sort and/or the Story Inquiry.

The frequency differences

by age groups were not statistically significant, but
the trend was in the expected direction,

i.e.,

the con

creteness of the stimulus form appeared to have a dif
ferential effect for younger Ss.
One other finding lends credence to the assertion
that verbal presentation of the stimuli facilitates ani
mism.

The frequencies of Ss calling individual objects

"alive" on the Questionnaire

(verbal)

task were slightly

higher than the frequencies for the Card Sort
and the Story Inquiry

(model p r e s e n t a t i o n ) .

true especially for the 3-year-olds,

(pictorial)
This was

although, again,

the difference is not statistically significant.
From the accumulation of data in the present study
it would appear that little difference in the manifesta
tion of animism could be attributed to differences in

83
stimulus presentation, provided other variables of the
experimental stiuation are held constant.
What Constitutes A n i m i s m ?
Several decisions face the experimenter in the in
vestigation of animism.

These include deciding what

behaviors constitute the expression of animism and how
to analyze these behaviors once the research is completed.
The former involves the operational definition of animism,
a major source of disagreement as illustrated in an
earlier section of this paper.

Huang

(1943)

and Klingberg

(1957) have attacked those who would include such com
plicated concepts as growth, birth,

reproduction, meta

bolism, and moral conscience in the child's attribution
of "life" to an inanimate object.

Although the semantic

problem of what the question "Is the _____ alive?" actually
means was not directly tested in the present research,
data from the Story Inquiry task contributes some insight
into related concepts,
feelings of guilt,
for punishment.

such as intention of action,

the attribution of blame,

Generally,

and the need

the data indicated that for

inanimate objects called "alive" there was a tendency to
also attribute intention, blame, and the need for punish
ment.

These trends were not statistically evaluate

and the frequencies of each, except for the need for
punishment, were higher among the younger Ss.
of guilt or upset were found with the older Ss,

Feelings
the younger

Ss frequently describing a characteristic of the object
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rather than conveying a feeling tone.

Therefore,

although the data from the current study is inconclusive,
it does appear that some of the composite traits of
"aliveness" are included in the child's concept of life.
The methods of data analysis have led to confusion
in comparing the results of several studies of animism.
Previous studies substantiating the presence of animism
have analyzed results in terms of the number of £s ex 
hibiting at least one animistic response during the
experimental procedure

(grouped d a t a ) .

Investigators

embracing the view that there is not a reliably different
process operating in children have utilized individual
data analysis, whereby each item is scored in terms of
the number of children reacting animistically to it.
The problem thus appears one of measuring internal ani
mistic consistency within Ss or within items.

In addition,

there is the problem of deciding "how many" non-naturalistic responses must be observed,
ner in which it is measured,

regardless of the m a n 

to constitute animism.

These

decisions appeared to have been answered in previous
research according to theoretical persuasion;

the present

study utilized both methods of analyzing the data.
Intra-subject consistency for animism was exhibited
in the reliable classification of Ss into four stages of
animism on the basis of Questionnaire data.

This con

sistency within Ss across tasks is expressed in the
intercorrelations of animism scores for the three tasks
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and the moderate degree of correspondence between stages
assigned on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort.
Analyzing responses to individual items on each of
the three tasks revealed that the average percentages of
Ss calling inanimate objects alive ranged from 30% to
60%.

The question then becomes one of setting a cut-off

point, e.g., all items being called alive at least 50% of
the time should be evidence of animism.

Huang and his

associates interpreted Piaget's theory as meaning that
100% of the children in the first stage of animism would
call 100% of the inanimate objects alive 100% of the
time.

As discussed in an earlier paragraph,

misinterpretation of the theory.

this was a

Therefore, when Huang

and other opponents of the precausal notion reported that
their research failed to substantiate the existence of
animism, the above criteria were being employed.
Experience gained from the present research revealed
that Ss in the same stage of animism would call different
inanimate objects alive and for different reasons, al 
though the general rationale expressed was similar as
defined by the criteria for that particular stage.
that reason,

For

individual item analysis would have an

attenuating statistical effect and create a tendency to
ignore the basis for the behavior.

The Basis of Animism
Beyond the methodological considerations discussed
above lies the theoretical schema of "aliveness"

for
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the child:

what criteria serve to discriminate between

objects called alive and not alive?
The developmental sequence of these criteria are
reflected in the stages of animism.

To investigate

whether physical characteristics of objects determined
their "aliveness",

the Questionnaire protocols were group

ed into three categories on the basis of the characteris
tics of the objects used by the Ss.

Excluding the £s

who exhibited no comprehension of the concept,

it was

found that only a few Ss used superficial characteristics
of the objects and most employed functional traits in
making their decisions.
found to be important,
object to people,

For younger S s , movement was
as was the service value of an

and whether it was in usable condition.

Older £s discriminated between functions,

accepting some

and rejecting others as prerequisite for life.

Data

from the Card Sort task indicated that older Ss more
easily identified broken items as not capable of mo v e 
ment and not alive.

This is in agreement with the notion

that children discriminate between damaged and whole ob
jects in attributing life

(Russell & Dennis,

1939).

The stages of animism described by Laurendeau and
Pinard

(1962) hypothesize movement as a criterial variable

for assessing aliveness.

The Card Sort task in the

present study was designed to ascertain the association
between mover.ent and aliveness.

The results indicated a

close relationship between the ability of an object to

move and the probability that it w o u l d be called alive.
It is interesting to note that older Ss were more willing
than younger Ss to grant movement to objects correctly
labeled not alive.

Trends in the same direction were

found for the categories of autonomous movement and
aliveness.

It is impossible to tell whether the tendency

to attribute autonomous movement but not life to inani
mate objects is expressing the beginning of poetic
license as used by adults,

the lack of understanding by

the Ss of autonomous movement as expressed in the task,
or the lack of relationship between autonomous movement
and aliveness for the £s.
Further clues regarding the concept of life are
expressed in Ss' performance on Card Sort items depicting
animate objects.

Subjects characterized by animism stage

as being non-animistic continued to deny life to some
living objects,

particularly the tree and flower.

These

results substantiate earlier findings that plant life
is often called "not alive" because of the absence of
anthropomorphic traits

(Laurendeau & Pinard,

196 2; Huang

& L e e , 1945).
Evidence from the present study substantiate earlier
theoretical schemas regarding the basis of animism set
forth by Piaget and his supporters.

Young children ap

pear to place central value on the ability of an object
to perform a function in discriminating between "alive"
and "not alive".

In performing a function an object is

usually perceived as capable of movement,
or autonomous.

either imparted

The criteria may appear blended with one

another and employed interchangably as the child approaches
the concept of living held by educated adults of his
society.

And yet, although the total process may seem to

be a blending of criteria, most Ss in the current research
utilized one predominant criterion for most items.

It

is interesting to note that very few £s hesitated in
stating why something was alive,

the expression of their

opinion conveying a feeling of certainity.
contrast to Huang's

(1943)

This is in

assertion that children answer

at random and can be easily swayed in their opinions.
Although the characteristics of an object might
determine the particular words used by an S^, results of
the current study employing three tasks suggest that the
general conceptual level telescopes S's thinking initially
upon the presentation of a stimulus.
however,

One must recognize,

that two stimulus items which differ only in the

degree of abstraction inherent in them might well serve
to focus the child differentially in his often transitory
stage of conceptual development.

This stage might be

conceptualized as a bounded figure rather than a point in
cognitive space;

a child could conceivably maneuver along

this continuum, with the upper end leading toward a
higher conceptual level, being approached and overtaken
in a series of ever-nearing sweeps, much like a pendulum
attached to a slowly moving conveyor belt.

Encounters
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with situations along the way would cause the pendulum to
swing, meeting with the most economical rectification of
present stimuli with past experiences.

Needless to say,

this progression would not inevitably be in a forward
direction,

thus the backslides and failures which continue

to occur even when the new concept appears to have been
mastered.

This description is similar to Piaget's con

cept of equilibration which holds that the organism is
always striving towards a state of equilibrium.

The

process of changing from state to state is termed equili
bration, with the additional processes of assimiliation
and accommodation serving to incorporate new situations
or concepts

(Phillips, 1969).

The single most impressive result gleaned from data
in this study has been the consistency of 3-7 4- and 5-yearolds in conveying their concepts of aliveness.

To be

sure, there were intra-subject disagreements, but a
majority of Ss were markedly consistent.

The three tasks

were found to be reliable and valid instruments for the
measurement of animism.

Data from these procedures were

analyzed with the optimal statistical techniques available,
the results indicating that, by groups and individually,
Ss could be categorized as possessing varying amounts
of animism.
In summary, analyses of the responses to the three
tasks in the present research generally support the
dewcription of the developmental sequence of animism
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posited by Piaget and refined by Laurendeau and Pinard
(1962).

New directions suggested by Looft and Bartz

(1969) were initiated in the present study and found to
have close correspondence with traditional methods used.
Therefore,

the door is opened to pursue more rigorously

the new avenues of research into the child's conception
of aliveness.

APPENDIX A

CARD SORT STIMULI
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APPENDIX B

STORY INQUIRY STIMULI

APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS TO JUDGES FOR ASSIGNING
ANIMISM STAGES ON THE BASIS
OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

INSTRUCTIONS

Please consider each Questionnaire protocol indepen
dently.

Each one should be judged by the following

criteria.

Those items marked with an X have been scored

as answered incorrectly,

i.e., inanimate objects were

labeled as being alive by the S_.

Consider all answers in

determining the stage of animism.

Please read the cri

teria carefully, and ask me any questions you might have
before starting the judgments.

Enter the stage next to

the S's number on the tally sheet.

Stage 0:

Incomprehension or r e f u s a l .

This stage

comprises those iSs who could not understand the questions
or answered at random without ever giving valid explana
tions.

An example of this type is the following:

Age 4:6:
"You know what it is to be alive?
What
does it mean?
.1 don*t k n o w .
Is a mountain alive?
No.
Why do you say it is not alive?--Because it is s a n d .
The sun?
Yes.
W h y ? --It*s wa r m wKen the sun is t h e r e .
An automobile?
No. -- Why?-— Because~i’t ls not a l i v e .
The table?
Y e s •-- Why?
Because it's a l i v e .--- A cat?--Y e s .-- Why?
It says ym e e o w * .-:— A cloud?
No.
why?-- It's a slcy, a cloud. " (Laurendeau & Pinard,
1962, p T T T l T . -------Often a subject in Stage 0 will use the same reason
to attribute and deny life to objects, thus illustrating
his ignorance of logical operations.
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This results in
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contradictions in the protocol,
prelogical thinking.

typical of infantile,

The child's "yes's" and "no's" often

seem to be independent of his explanations.

Another

example of Stage 0 thinking:
Age 6:0:
"you know what it is to be alive?
Yes.
What does it mea n ?
To be b o r n .Give me the name,
tell me some thing w h i c h T s alive.
A n i m a l s .--A mountain? -- No.--- Why ?--- 1^ know it.
The sun?---N o .---- Wh y ?
Because IE know i t .-The table?--No.
Why?
1 know "it.
An automobile?
N o .--w K y ? ---- It. r u n s .
A cat?
Y e s .-W h y ?
We often see
some c a t s .
A cloud?--- Y e s .
Why?
Because I_ say
so.
A lamp?
No.--- Why ?
Because it's not a l i v e .
A w a tch?-- No.--- Wh y ? --- Because it r u n s .
A
bir d ?
Yes.
Why?
Because it lilies in~the a i r .
A bell?
No.
Why?
Because I_ know i t .
The
wind?
No.
Why?
Because it*s something cold and
does not r u n .
An airplane?
N o .-■— why? - - - Because
it flies in the air like b i r d s .
A fly?
Y e s .--Why?
Because it flies in the ai r . " (Ibid, p. 142).

Stage 1:

Animistic thinking based upon u s e f u l n e s s ,

a n t hropomorphism, or m o v e m e n t .
Subjects in this stage commit errors of the animistic
type by attributing life to one or many inanimate objects.
These £3s use criteria which are imperfect, but the authors
remark on the consistency of the child's thinking.

"He

never resorts to the same reason to attribute or refuse
life"

(I b i d , p. 145).

Frequently a combination of two

or even three of these criteria can be seen in explanations.
Some children may refuse life to plants and trees by
reason that they do not move, or are perceived by the
child to be immobile.

An example of this stage is:

Age 4:6:
"You know what it is to be alive?
What does it mean?
I don't know.
Is a

No.
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mountain alive?
No.
Why do you say that it is
not alivev
It does not have a m o u t h .
The sun?
Yes.
Why?
I_t has a m o u t E .— -The table?--No.
Why?
It does not have a m o u t h .
An auto
mobile?
Yes.
Why?
It has w h e e l s .
A cat?--Yes.
Why?
rt has mouth's.
A cloud?
Y e s .--Why?
It has mouths since it r a i n s .
The w i n d ? --Yes.
Wh y ?
It has m o u t h s ; it b l o w s ." (I b i d , p . 145).

Stage 2:

Autonomous movement with some residual

animistic t h inking.
This stage, characterized as one of transition,

is

distinguished from Stage 1 by the discovery of two dis
tinct sources of movement.

Only one of these,

that is,

where the source of the movement is the object itself, now
serves as a criterion for life.

Laurendeau and Pinard

discuss how this criterion alone does not serve to cause
the total disappearance of animism.

Most importantly,

children continue for some time to delude themselves as
to the real source of movement, particularly with regard
to those objects most removed from direct experience,
as the wind,

such

sun, moon, etc.

Another reason is that "the discovery of autonomous
movement does not definitely displace the inadequate or
imperfect criteria of the first stage.

In fact, the most

frequent occurrence is that the child relies upon autonomy
to justify some, of his responses, but for the other
responses still resorts frequently to usefulness of ob
jects, to their possessing anthropomorphic traits, or to
their general movement.

All subjects of this stage,

however, at least make mention of autonomous movement."
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(Ibid, p. 147).

An example of Stage 2 thinking is:

Age 10:0:
"What does it mean to be alive?
It
means that you can move a b o u t , p l a y , that you can do
all kinds of t h i n g s .
Give me the name of some thing
which is aTTve.--- Y o u .-- Is a mountain alive?
Yes.
Wh y ? -- Because it has ^rown by i t s e l f .---- The
sun?
Y e s .-- w h y ?
Because it gives light.---- The
table?
No.
Why?
Because the tree-whi c h was
used to make the table~~is d e a d .
A cloud?
-Y e s .--Why?
Because it sends water on the e a r t h .— -The
w i n d ? — Y e s .-- wK y ?
Because it pushes t h i n g s.---The fire?
No.--- W h y ? -- Because it cannot light up
by itself." Tlbid, p. 148TI

Stage 3:

Total disappearance of animistic t h i n k i n g .

Subjects in this stage never grant life to inanimate
objects,

at least to those listed in the Questionnaire.

The reverse of this is not true, that is, Ss often refuse
life to some animate objects, especially plants, on the
basis of lack of autonomy and for anthropomorphic reasons.
Explanations given may be anthropomorphic, or based on
usefulness or activity.

An example of this type of

thinking i s :

Age 9:0:
" . . . A m ountain?— — N o .
Why?
It
doesn't w a l k , it always remains at the same p l a c e .
The sun?
No.
Wny ?
I_t cannot m o v e , it
remains at the same p l a c e .
The table?
No.--Why?
It cannot displace i t s e l f .
An automobile?
No. -- Why?--- It needs a motor to make it r u n .--A cat?-- Y e s .--- w E y ?
It can w a l F T
A cloud?--- N o .
W h y ? - — It cannot displace i t s e l f .
A lamp?--No.
Wh y ?
rt cannot walk by i t s e l f .
A bird?--Yes.
Why?
It can f l y .
A bell?
No.
W h y ? --It needs a man to ring i t .
The fire?
No.
Why?
It does not displace-'itself as it wishes."
(Ibid, p. 15TF.
General remarks about classifying protocols:

A

general rule of thumb is to determine the highest stage
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on each protocol,

even though that criterion might have

been mentioned only once.

Characteristic of all stages

is that imperfect criteria from preceding stages may also
be present.

No errors are necessary for a Stage 3 rating.

Except for item 1, the items are recorded on the
answer sheet by numbers.

The list of corresponding stimu

lus items for these numbers are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

mountain
table
cat
lamp
bird
wind
fly
flower
tree
bicycle
pencil
sun

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

car
cloud
watch
bell
airplane
fire
rain
snake
fish
child (boy or girl,
sex as S)
dog

same

Some common abbreviations I used during testing:
bee. or cau. = because
s.o.
= someone
e.t.
= everything, everytime
IDK
= I don't know
w.
= with
s.t.
= something, sometime
a.t.
= anything, anytime
s.b.
= somebody
underlined consonant at end of wor d = add ’ing" to
word
arrow (-»•)
= look on back of page for the rest
of the response
£
= like(s) or look(s)
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